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ABSTRACT 
There is a growing need for high-assurance architectures that support mandatory 
confidentiality and integrity policies. One such architecture currently under development 
is the Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA), a distributed multilevel secure (MLS) 
computing environment that integrates untrusted commercial off-the-shelf components 
with specialized high-assurance elements.   
To ensure that information is purged from untrusted client PCs between sessions 
at different security levels, MYSEA clients are diskless.  Therefore, it is desirable for thin 
MYSEA clients to be able to remotely execute server-resident applications, which may in 
turn request access to data residing elsewhere on the MLS Local Area Network (LAN).  
This functionality must be implemented in such a way that the access control policies of 
the multilevel environment are maintained.  Working from a detailed design for remote 
application support, this thesis involved the implementation and testing of the remote 
application support functionality. Beyond the implementation of remote application 
support itself, this thesis involved the porting of a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) 
client and the development of a simple web client as proof-of-concept remote 
applications, as well as the creation of a Common Gateway Interface (CGI) mechanism 
for invoking those remote applications from a client web browser.  This research is 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MOTIVATION OF STUDY  
Government, military, and business organizations that currently maintain multiple 
networks to host data at differing security levels stand to benefit by replacing them with a 
single high-assurance multilevel secure (MLS) network, due to the increased efficiency 
and reduced costs associated with the management of a single network as opposed to 
many.  There is a growing need for high-assurance architectures that implement multi-
domain information protection mechanisms.   
The Global Information Grid (GIG) envisioned by the United States Department 
of Defense provides “a seamless, secure, and interconnected information environment, 
meeting real-time and near real-time needs of both the warfighter and the business user” 
[1].  This environment will likely contain data residing at various security levels, and 
could therefore benefit from the use of cross-domain solutions that would enable multiple 
levels of data to be accessed from a single node.  One such solution currently under 
development is the Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA), a distributed multilevel 
secure computing environment that integrates untrusted commercial off-the-shelf 
components with specialized high-assurance elements [2].   
In the MYSEA architecture, multilevel servers provide isolation between security 
domains and thin clients access the data within each domain as permitted by the servers.  
To ensure that information is purged from untrusted client PCs between sessions at 
different security levels, MYSEA clients are diskless.  Therefore, it is desirable for thin 
MYSEA clients to be able to remotely execute server-resident applications, which may in 
turn request access to data residing elsewhere on the MLS Local Area Network (LAN) or 
on a connected single-level network.  This functionality must be implemented in such a 
way that the access control policies of the multilevel environment are maintained.  Prior 
to the completion of this thesis, the design for remote application support had been 




B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The objective of this thesis was to implement remote application support in the 
MYSEA environment.  Implementation was to be based on the pre-existing design, 
refined as necessary during the course of implementation and testing.  This thesis was 
meant to provide concrete answers to the questions: 
1. What modifications to the existing design are necessary to successfully 
implement remote application support on the MYSEA server? 
2. What additional functionality, if any, is required to support the remote 
execution of specific desired applications? 
Beyond the implementation of the trusted server processes that enable remote 
application support, this project involved the porting of two simple network-enabled 
remote applications onto the MYSEA server, and the creation of a Common Gateway 
Interface (CGI) mechanism for invoking those remote applications from a client web 
browser.  This project further involved the development and execution of a test plan to 
verify the functionality of each of the newly implemented remote application support 
components and of the integrated remote application support system. 
 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
• Chapter I has provided an introduction to the motivation and purpose of this 
thesis, including a brief introduction to the Monterey Security Architecture 
(MYSEA) and the anticipated role of remote application support in the 
multilevel MYSEA environment.   
• Chapter II provides a more in-depth look at the MYSEA architecture and the 
multilevel XTS-400 system that hosts the MYSEA server software, focusing 
on those aspects of its architecture that have most influenced the design for 
remote application support.  This chapter also describes the envisioned 
functionality and benefits brought about by the implementation of remote 
application support in the MYSEA environment.   
3 
• Chapter III provides a high-level description of the requirements and design 
for remote application support, as described in a previous thesis [3].  This 
chapter also discusses changes made to the design between the publication of 
[3] and the beginning of this project, and specifies which of the remote 
application support components laid out in [3] were modified or implemented 
for this project. 
• Chapter IV describes the development environment, implementation 
requirements for each module developed as part of this project, and 
unforeseen issues that arose during the course of implementation. 
• Chapter V describes the developmental and acceptance testing performed on 
each of the components implemented for this project. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. MONTEREY SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (MYSEA) 
The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA), under development at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, was designed to serve as a trusted, distributed, multilevel secure 
(MLS) environment that integrates a small number of high-assurance components with a 
greater number of untrusted commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components.  The 
motivation behind this architecture was the realization that “unless a secure system offers 
users comfortable and familiar interfaces for handling routine information, it will fail due 
to lack of user acceptability” [2].  The MYSEA architecture consists of three types of 
physical components: high-assurance MLS servers; commercial off-the-shelf client PCs; 
and pre-existing single-level networks.   
The MYSEA server runs on a DigitalNet XTS-400, a high-assurance multilevel 
secure platform that includes a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) operating in conjunction 
with untrusted, constrained Application Protocol Servers. The MYSEA server consists of 
the following additional components: a Secure Session Services (SSS) component that is 
used to launch instances of the untrusted application protocol servers at the current 
session levels of the users requesting their services; a Trusted Path Services (TPS) 
component, which extends the native XTS-400 trusted path support for local terminals to 
remote MYSEA clients; and a Dynamic Security Services (DSS) Manager1, which 
governs security and performance factors of the various MYSEA components. 
A MYSEA client consists of two physical components: an untrusted personal 
computer (PC) and a Trusted Path Extension (TPE).  The PC is a COTS product, either a 
thin client that accesses remote applications or a typical PC hosting a commercial 
operating system and application suite.  The TPE, which currently has a hand-held form 
factor, is responsible for providing a secure, unforgeable connection between the user and 
the security functions of the MYSEA server by way of a trusted path.  The trusted path is 
invoked when the user presses the Secure Attention Key (SAK) on the client.   
                                                 
1 This component is currently under development. 
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To ensure that session information is purged from untrusted client PCs between 
sessions at different security levels, MYSEA clients are stateless.  On startup, they boot 
their operating system (for example, a Linux or Windows variant) from a non-writable 
source into RAM.  The use of popular commercial operating systems on the client 
systems ensures that users may continue to use their favorite applications with an 
interface they are familiar with.  It also makes the acquisition of end-user applications 
much easier in terms of cost and availability. 
MYSEA servers and clients are co-located on a MLS local area network (LAN), 
and the network interface on the server connecting it to the MYSEA clients is configured 
at the level of the MLS LAN.  This means that any process running on the server that 
requires access to the network interface, including the SSS and TPS processes, must also 
run at the level of the MLS LAN.  This requirement will be revisited later in this chapter. 
One or more single-level networks, each operating at its own security level, may 
be connected to the MYSEA server by way of a Trusted Channel Module (TCM).  The 
function of the TCM is to authenticate the single-level network to the MYSEA server and 
provide high-assurance labeling of the information entering the server from the network. 
 
B. XTS-400 ARCHITECTURE 
1. Overview 
DigitalNet’s XTS-400 system, the platform on which the MYSEA server is based, 
combines an Intel x86 hardware base with the high-assurance multilevel secure STOP 6 
operating system. STOP provides a Linux-like user and programming interface, allowing 
for many existing Linux applications to be run on the XTS without modification.  It 
provides not only traditional discretionary access control (DAC), but also mandatory 
access control (MAC), which is implemented in accordance with the Bell-LaPadula 
model for confidentiality [4] and the Biba policy for integrity [5]. 
The Bell-LaPadula security model [4] formalizes a policy to prevent unauthorized 
access to confidential data.  It does this by enforcing two policies: the simple security 
policy and the security-* (or confinement) property.  The simple security policy states 
that a subject may read an object if and only if the security level of the subject dominates 
7 
(is greater than or equal to) the security level of the object.   This would allow, for 
example, a user logged in at the Secret level to read Secret, Confidential, and 
Unclassified documents, but not Top Secret documents.  The * property states that a 
subject may write to an object if and only if the security level of the subject is dominated 
by the security level of the object.  This would allow a user logged in at the Secret level 
to write to Secret and Top Secret documents, but not to Confidential or Unclassified 
documents.  The STOP implementation of the Bell-LaPadula model actually enforces a 
stricter version of this rule: it allows a subject to write to an object only when the subject 
and object are at the same security level.  This prevents lower-level subjects from writing 
higher-level objects they cannot later access [6]. 
The Biba integrity model [5] was designed to prevent the unauthorized 
modification of data.  It does this by enforcing two analogous policies for integrity: the 
simple integrity policy and the integrity-* property.  The simple integrity policy states 
that a user may read an object if and only if the integrity level of the object dominates the 
integrity level of the subject.  The integrity-* property states that a subject may write to 
an object if and only if the integrity level of the subject dominates the integrity level of 
the object.  (Once again, STOP implements a variant of this policy that allows writes by 
subjects only to objects at the same integrity level.) Note that these policies are 
equivalent to the Bell-LaPadula security policies with the dominance relations reversed.  
The STOP system’s mandatory integrity policy allows for the establishment of highly 
protected execution domains in which executables may read files they need, while those 
files remain protected from modification by unauthorized logic or malicious code [6]. 
The STOP operating system distinguishes between applications that are trusted 
and those that are untrusted.  System administrators may grant applications certain 
privileges, including the ability to bypass mandatory and/or discretionary controls.  Any 
application granted such privileges or assigned a high integrity level is considered a 
trusted application.  All other applications, including (by default) the user commands and 
tools familiar to Linux/UNIX users, are considered untrusted and are subject to the MAC 
and DAC policies described above [6]. 
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The XTS-400 has been evaluated at the Common Criteria [7] EAL-5+ level [8].  
Its access control mechanisms, high level of assurance, and support for Linux 
applications make it a suitable platform for the MYSEA server, and several of its unique 
features have helped shape the design for remote application support.  These features, and 
their influence on the design, are described in [3] and summarized in the following 
sections. 
 
2. TCP/IP Privileged Ports 
The XTS prohibits normal user programs from using TCP/IP privileged ports; 
only processes running as the network user can use these ports.  Furthermore, only trusted 
programs may be given the privilege to change their user identifier.  
Remote applications and application protocol servers need to make use of 
privileged ports, but are designed to run at the level of the user invoking them. To 
designate them as trusted applications would be undesirable, as it would increase the 
amount of trusted code necessary on the system. The restriction on privileged port access 
therefore necessitates the introduction of trusted programs to service these ports on behalf 
of untrusted remote applications and application protocol servers. 
 
3. Trusted and Untrusted Processes 
The processes implementing remote application support require MAC/DAC 
exemption in order to communicate with both the network interface (which runs at the 
level of the MLS LAN) and the untrusted remote application (which runs at the level of 
the user who invoked it).  Certain processes also require the ability to set their user ID to 
that of the network user, as discussed in the previous section.  In order to be granted these 
privileges, the programs must be designated trusted applications.  Privilege requirements 
specific to each process are discussed in more detail in Chapter III. 
 
4. System Calls 
Many of the standard Linux system calls are available on the XTS-400 and are 
accessible to user applications.  However, some system calls are specific to the XTS-400 
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and may only be used by trusted applications.  Others have increased functionality when 
called by trusted applications.  For example, a read call may provide the capability to 
read an object at any of various levels when invoked by a trusted process [3].   
Processes implementing remote application support make use of XTS-specific 
system calls in order to enable and disable any special privilege sets that they require.  A 
Privileges Module, discussed further in Chapter III, has been implemented to encapsulate 
these system calls in an intuitive interface.  Per-process privilege requirements are also 
discussed in Chapter III. 
 
C. OVERVIEW OF REMOTE APPLICATION SUPPORT 
With the implementation of remote application support, a user logged in to the 
MYSEA server remotely has the ability to launch server-resident applications from his or 
her client using only a web browser.  This is a useful capability, considering that MYSEA 
clients are diskless and must therefore work around the following limitations: 
1. The amount of RAM available to run applications on the client may be 
limited. 
2. Data created or retrieved by the client will be purged at the end of each user 
session. 
3. Typical system maintenance tasks involving the installation or upgrade of 
client software will be complicated by the client’s lack of non-volatile storage.  
Installing or upgrading a single application could require re-burning the entire 
non-writeable medium on which the client’s operating system and complete 
application suite are stored. 
In a remote-application-enabled environment, a user logged in to a MYSEA 
server from a remote client may use a simple web interface to request a list of remote 
applications supported by the server or to specify a particular remote application to be 
executed.  The requested remote application is invoked on the server, and its output is 
displayed back to the user via the web interface.  Because the processing is performed on 
the server, the user need not worry whether sufficient resources are available on the 
10 
client, and data retrieved or created by the user may be saved in persistent storage on the 
server.  Furthermore, the centralized server-resident applications may be easily 




This chapter has provided an introduction to the MYSEA architecture, including 
the security policies enforced within the multilevel MYSEA environment and specific 
characteristics of the XTS-400 system on which the MYSEA server software is installed.  
It has introduced the concept of remote application support, and discussed the envisioned 
benefits that remote application support will bring to the MYSEA environment.   
Chapter III more formally describes the functional requirements for remote 
application support, and summarizes the detailed design specifications [3] that paved the 
way for the implementation of remote application support on the MYSEA server. 
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III. REQUIREMENTS AND DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The remote application functionality described in the previous chapter must be 
implemented in such a way that the access control policies of the multilevel environment 
are maintained.  This means, for one, ensuring that remote applications are launched at 
the session level of the user invoking them.  It also means ensuring that applications 
launched remotely are able to establish outbound connections only with those 
destinations authorized to communicate at the application’s current session level. These 
policies must be enforced while operating within the constraints imposed by the STOP 
operating system regarding trusted and untrusted processes, privileged ports, and 
privileged systems calls, while minimizing the amount of trusted code that must be 
introduced onto the system. 
This chapter describes, at a high level, the design for MYSEA remote application 
support that was developed and presented in a previous thesis [3].  Section B of this 
chapter lists the functional requirements that shaped this design.  Section C describes 
each of the processes, databases, and modules contributing to the functionality of the 
remote application support mechanism, including those that were implemented both prior 
to and during the course of this project.  Section D describes changes made to the design 
subsequent to its original specification in [3] but prior to its implementation.  Finally, 
Section E identifies those components of the remote application functionality that needed 
to be implemented or modified specifically for this project.   
 
B. TOP-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS 
The design for remote application (RA) support was derived from the following 
top-level user requirements [3]: 
• The RA shall be able to communicate with the local MLS server, a remote 
MLS server and a RA server.   
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• The remote application shall be appropriately bound to the authenticated 
user’s session.  Specifically, the remote application process shall run with the 
user ID and at the current session level of the authenticated user. 
• The user shall be able to launch the RA from the client. 
• The MLS server shall be able to support both Unix/Linux and Microsoft 
Windows clients. 
• The design shall only require a minimal number of changes to the RA. 
 
C. HIGH-LEVEL DESIGN 
1. Overview 
Figure 1 presents an overview of the processes playing a part in remote 
application support on the MYSEA server.  Shaded boxes represent processes that were 
implemented specifically for this project. 
 
Figure 1.   Process Overview (after [3]) 
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The Secure System Daemon (SSD) and Trusted Path Server (TPS) Parent 
processes are system daemons launched at system startup.  The SSD launches a Secure 
Session Server (SSS) Parent for each application protocol supported by the server, 
including HTTP.  The TPS Parent accepts login requests from remote clients, and 
delegates the handling of trusted path communications from each client to a dedicated 
TPS Child process.  If the user successfully logs in, the TPS Child creates a Trusted 
Remote Session Server (TRSS) Parent to handle remote application requests from that 
user.  The SSD, SSS, TPS, and TRSS processes are each considered trusted, and are 
allowed access to the MLS network interface. 
After successfully logging in from a Trusted Path Extension (TPE), a user may 
open up a web browser and request a web page with links to launch supported remote 
applications.  The SSS Parent designated to handle HTTP requests receives the user’s 
request and passes it to an SSS Child designated to handle HTTP requests specifically 
from that user.  The SSS Child in turn launches httpd, the HTTP daemon, which handles 
the user’s web page request.  Because httpd is an untrusted application and cannot access 
the MLS network interface directly, nor bind to privileged ports, all of its socket 
communications must go through the trusted SSS Child process that launched it.    
The user selects a remote application from the list, and httpd executes a Common 
Gateway Interface (CGI) script which launches the application at the session level of the 
requesting user.  This application is also untrusted and cannot access the MLS network 
interface directly.  If the application requires the use of sockets, it signals the TRSS 
Parent, which launches a trusted, dedicated TRSS Child process to handle socket 
communications on behalf of the untrusted application.  These may include 
communications with peers residing elsewhere on the network, or with an Application 
Protocol Server (APS) residing on the local server.  In the latter case, the resulting APS 
connection request must be validated by the SSS Parent, which launches an SSS Child to 








a. Trusted Path Server (TPS) Parent 
The Trusted Path Server Parent process is a system daemon that runs at 
the startup of the MYSEA server.  It is responsible for accepting and validating trusted 
path session requests received from TPEs.  When it receives a request for a trusted path 
session, it checks for the TPE identifier in the Allowed TPE Database.  If the TPE 
identifier is found, the TPS Parent forks a TPS Child process to handle the trusted path 
connection with the TPE.  Otherwise, it drops the connection.  It then continues to accept 
and validate subsequent TPS requests. 
The TPS Parent runs at the level of the MLS LAN.  Because it must also 
write to system-low databases, it is designated a trusted process. 
 
b. Trusted Path Server (TPS) Child 
Once a TPE request has been validated by the TPS Parent, the TPS Child 
is responsible for handling further trusted path session communications from that TPE.  
This includes requests to log in, set the session level, run the session, and log out.  When 
the TPS Child receives data from the client, it first checks that it begins with a Secure 
Attention Request Packet (SARP).  It then reads and processes the client’s command, 
transmits the output to the client, and waits for the next command. 
The TPS Child process is also responsible for launching a TRSS Parent 
process to handle connection requests by remote applications launched from the client. 
The TPS Child runs at the level of the MLS LAN.  Because it also requires 
access to system-low databases, as well as the system’s user identification and 





c. Secure Session Daemon (SSD)  
The Secure Session Daemon is a system daemon that runs at startup.  It 
first checks the Allowed Protocols Database to see which protocols the server supports 
(e.g., HTTP, IMAP, SMTP, etc.).  For each protocol entry in the database, it then forks an 
SSS Parent process to handle service requests for that protocol.   
Before forking, it obtains the handles to the User Database and Remote 
Connection Database so that each of its forked child processes will not have to. 
The SSD process terminates when either, all of its forked children have 
terminated, or it is interrupted by a local Secure Attention Key (SAK).  In the latter case, 
it is responsible for also signaling each of its forked SSS Parent processes to terminate.  
Because these processes require access to privileged ports and must therefore run as the 
network user, the SSD process must also be able to run as the network user in order to 
fork and terminate them.  The SSD is therefore designated a trusted process. 
 
d. Secure Session Server (SSS) Parent 
Each Secure Session Server Parent process is responsible for accepting 
and validating application protocol service requests for a particular TCP/IP protocol.  
After accepting a request, the process verifies that a trusted session has been established 
for the requesting TPE by checking to see whether it has an entry in the User Database.  
If no such entry is found, it checks for a valid remote application connection in the 
Remote Connections Database.  If the TPE is found to be associated with either a valid 
user session or a valid remote application connection, an SSS Child process is spawned to 
service the connection; otherwise, the connection is dropped.  The SSS Parent process 
then continues to accept and validate new application protocol service requests. 
The SSS Parent runs at the level of the MLS LAN.  Because it must be 
able to switch to the user ID of the network user in order to access privileged ports, and 
because it must also be able to fork child processes with MAC/DAC exemption and the 




e. Secure Session Server (SSS) Child 
The SSS Child process is responsible for launching an Application 
Protocol Server (APS) process to service each application protocol service request from a 
given TPE or remote application.  The APS process runs at the session level negotiated 
by the user via the TPE, or at the session level of the remote application requesting 
service.  Because the APS process is untrusted, it does not have access to the MLS 
interface and must therefore rely on the SSS Child process to perform socket operations 
on its behalf.  The two processes communicate via a MYSEA socket (MSKT) allocated 
by the TPS Child process.  Any time the APS needs to make a socket call, it enters its 
request into the MSKT Database and signals the SSS Child process.  The SSS Child 
process then retrieves the requested call type and corresponding parameters from the 
MSKT Database and makes the appropriate socket library function call on behalf of the 
APS.  Once the function call has completed, the SSS Child sets the return value of the 
call and any data received into the appropriate fields in the database entry, and signals the 
APS process.  The APS is then able to retrieve the results of its socket call from the 
database. 
When an APS process requests access to a peer (via the connect, sendto, 
accept, or recvfrom socket calls), the SSS Child process is responsible for checking 
whether the connection is allowed before proceeding with the call.  It does this by 
consulting the Peer Level and User Databases to retrieve the current session level of the 
peer.  By comparing the session level of the peer with the session level of the APS, it is 
able to determine whether the access is allowable.  If so, the SSS Child must consult the 
Source Address Binding Database to determine the source address configured for use 
with the supplied destination address before binding the socket to a source port/address 
pair.   
For each new connection established on behalf of the APS process, the 
SSS Child updates the Remote Connections Database with the new connection and its 
current session level.  Upon the closing of each connection, the SSS Child removes the 
connection from the database. 
17 
The SSS Child runs at the level of the MLS LAN; however, it must also 
communicate with the APS running at the session level of the remote user.  Furthermore, 
it must switch to the user ID of the remote user before initializing the MSKT Database 
and launching the APS process, so that the APS process runs with the correct user ID and 
has read/write access to the MSKT database.  For these reasons, the SSS Child is 
designated a trusted process. 
 
f. Application Protocol Server (APS) 
The Application Protocol Server handles the server side of a client/server 
protocol. APS processes are untrusted, and run at the level of the user or remote 
application that invoked them.  APS processes requiring access to the MLS LAN or to 
privileged ports must request socket operations by way of an MSKT managed by an SSS 
Child process.  If an APS is ported from another platform, its socket calls for these 
special operations must therefore be modified to use the MSKT interface.  A number of 
APSs have already been ported to the MYSEA server in previous works. These include 
an Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) mail server [9, 10], a Simple Mail Transfer 
Protocol (SMTP) mail server, viz., Sendmail [11], and a Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP) web server [12].    
 
g. CGI Remote Application Invocation Process 
The CGI RA invocation process is spawned by the web APS in response 
to a user’s request to invoke an RA via the web interface.  Its primary responsibilities are 
to process the user’s RA request, launch the appropriate RA, and package the output of 
the RA into a web page to be returned to the user by the web APS. 
The RA invocation process is untrusted, and runs with the user ID and at 






h. Trusted Remote Session Server (TRSS) Parent 
The TRSS Parent process is launched by the TPS Child process, and is 
responsible for spawning a TRSS Child process for each remote application that requests 
the use of MYSEA sockets.   
Upon being launched, the TRSS Parent process first attaches to the 
databases required for its own operations and for those of its children.  It then waits until 
it is signaled by a remote application requesting a socket call for the first time.  Once 
signaled, it searches the MSKT Database for an entry whose call type is set to new socket 
call.  It then forks a TRSS Child process to handle the new socket request and all future 
socket calls from this remote application, and sets the trusted PID field of the MSKT 
Database entry to the process ID of child it has just forked.  It then waits until signaled by 
the next remote application requesting a socket call. 
Although the TRSS Parent does not access the MLS LAN, its child 
processes do.  Hence, the TRSS Parent must run at the level of the MLS LAN.  However, 
it must also be able to receive signals from remote applications running at the level of the 
user who invoked them.  Furthermore, it must be able to switch to the user ID of the user 
who requested the remote application invocation before it initializes the MSKT Database, 
so that the remote application has read/write access to the database.  For these reasons, 
the TRSS Parent is designated a trusted process. 
 
i. Trusted Remote Session Server (TRSS) Child 
The TRSS Child process is responsible for handling socket calls on behalf 
of its assigned remote application.  The two processes communicate via a MYSEA socket 
(MSKT) allocated by the TPS Child process.  Any time the RA requires access to the 
MLS interface, it enters its socket request into the MSKT Database and (for all but the 
first call) signals the TRSS Child process.  The TRSS Child process then retrieves the 
requested call type and corresponding parameters from the MSKT Database and makes 




the TRSS Child sets the return value of the call and any data received into the appropriate 
fields in the database entry, and signals the RA process.  The RA is then able to retrieve 
the results of its socket call from the database. 
When an RA process requests access to a peer (via the connect, sendto, 
accept, or recvfrom socket calls), the TRSS Child process is responsible for checking 
whether the connection is allowed before proceeding with the call.  It does this by 
consulting the Peer Level Database and the User Database to retrieve the current level of 
the peer.  By comparing the session level of the peer with the session level of the RA, it is 
able to determine whether the access is allowable.  If so, the TRSS Child must consult the 
Source Address Binding Database to determine the source address configured for use 
with the supplied destination address before binding the socket to a source port/address 
pair. 
For each new connection established on behalf of the RA process, the 
TRSS Child updates the Remote Connections Database with the new connection and its 
current session level.  Upon the closing of each connection, the TRSS Child removes the 
connection from the database. 
The TRSS Child runs at the level of the MLS LAN.  Because it requires 
access to privileged ports, and because it must also communicate with the RA running at 
the session level of the user who invoked it, the TRSS Child is designated a trusted 
process. 
 
j. Remote Application (RA) 
The remote application process is an application process executing on the 
server at the request of a remote client.  The RA process is untrusted, and runs at the 
session level of the user who invoked it.  The RA may only request socket operations on 
the MLS LAN by way of an MSKT managed by a TRSS Child process, as described 
above.  If an RA is ported from another platform, its socket calls must therefore be 
modified to use the MSKT interface. 
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Table 1 presents a summary of the processes involved in the execution of remote 
applications. 
 
Process  Trusted? Session Level Launched By Instances 
 TPS Parent Yes MLS LAN (System Daemon) One/System 
 TPS Child Yes MLS LAN TPS Parent One/TPE 
 SSD Yes MLS LAN (System Daemon) One/System 
 SSS Parent Yes MLS LAN SSD One/Allowed Protocol 
 SSS Child Yes MLS LAN SSS Parent One/APS-Client Connection 
 APS (httpd) No Remote User 
or RA 




No Remote User APS (httpd) One/RA Invocation Interface 
Request 
 TRSS Parent Yes MLS LAN TPS Child One/User-Session-Level 
 TRSS Child Yes MLS LAN TRSS Parent One/Remote App. 
 Remote App. No Remote User CGI RA 
Invocation process
One/RA Invocation Request 
Table 1. Process Attributes 
 
Table 2 summarizes the privileges required by each trusted process. 
 
Trusted Process  Privileges Required 
 TPS Parent • Ability to access the MLS LAN as well as system-low databases. 
 TPS Child • Ability to access the MLS LAN as well as system-low databases. 
• Ability to access user identification and authentication 
information. 
 SSD   • Ability to fork and terminate child processes that run as the 
network user. 
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Trusted Process  Privileges Required 
 SSS Parent • Ability to run as the network user in order to access privileged 
ports. 
• Ability to fork children that can access the MLS LAN and also 
communicate with user-level APS processes. 
• Ability to fork children that can switch user IDs. 
 SSS Child • Ability to access the MLS LAN and also communicate with user-
level APS processes. 
• Ability to switch to the user ID of the remote user before 
initializing the MSKT Database and launching the APS process. 
 TRSS Parent • Ability to switch to the user ID of the remote user before 
initializing the MSKT Database. 
• Ability to fork child processes with access to the MLS LAN and 
also communicate with user-level RA processes. 
• Ability to fork and terminate child processes that run as the 
network user. 
• Ability to be launched by low-integrity processes. (See Chapter IV 
for a discussion of the Trusted Parent Exempt privilege.) 
 TRSS Child • Ability to access the MLS LAN and also communicate with user-
level RA processes. 
• Ability to run as the network user in order to access privileged 
ports. 
Table 2. Privilege Requirements of Trusted Processes 
 
3. Databases 
a. Allowed Protocols Database 
The Allowed Protocols Database is a static, per-system database that lists 
the application protocols provided by the MYSEA server.  Each entry, corresponding to a 
single allowed protocol, consists of a descriptive identifier of the protocol (e.g., 
“HTTP”), a path to the executable that will provide the protocol service, and the port 
number on which it will listen for requests. 
The SSD process uses the Allowed Protocols Database to start an SSS 
Parent process for each allowed protocol. 
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b. Allowed TPE Database 
The Allowed TPE (Trusted Path Extension) Database is a static, per-
system database that lists the TPEs authorized to log in to the MYSEA server.  Each 
entry consists of the IP address of an allowed TPE.  
The TPS Parent process uses the Allowed TPE Database to restrict login 
access to authorized clients. 
 
c. User Database 
The User Database is a per-system database that is used to associate 
communications from a particular TPE with a specific user and session level.  There is 
one entry in the database for each active TPE.   
The database is maintained by the TPS Parent and Child processes, which 
update it every time a user logs in, changes his/her session level, or logs out.  The SSS 
Parent and Child processes use the database to determine the proper session level to 
associate with APS processes launched to handle requests from TPEs.  The SSS Child 
and TRSS Child processes also make use of the database when an APS or RA requests a 
connection with a peer, and that peer is not contained in the Peer Level Database.  In this 
case, it is assumed that the APS or RA process is attempting to communicate with a TPE; 
hence, the SSS or TRSS Child process must check to see that this TPE is logged in at a 
session level acceptable for communication with the requesting APS or RA. 
 
d. Remote Connection Database 
The Remote Connection Database is a per-system database that is used to 
bind connections initiated by RAs and APSs to specific users and session levels.  It is 
initialized by the TPS Parent, and updated by the TRSS Child or SSS Child each time the 
RA or APS requests the establishment or termination of a remote connection.  Each 
remote connection entry consists of a source port, a source IP address, a destination port, 
and a destination IP address. 
The SSS Parent uses the database to check whether incoming traffic is the 
result of a connection request by an RA or APS; it does this only if it fails to find a record 
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of the TPE in the User Database.  If the SSS Parent locates the remote connection in the 
database, the incoming data is passed on to the appropriate SSS Child process; otherwise, 
the connection is dropped. 
 
e. Remote Application MYSEA Socket Map (RAMSKT Map) 
Database 
The RAMSKT Map Database is a per-system database that is used to map 
a particular user and session level to the MYSEA Socket (MSKT) Database and TRSS 
Parent process assigned to provide remote application support for that user/session-level 
pair.  The TPS Parent initializes the memory block that contains the database, and the 
TPS Child allocates an entry for each authenticated user.  The database is read by the 
TRSS Parent and Child processes and by the RA to look up the MSKT Database handle 
to be used for socket communications between them. 
 
f. Application Protocol Server MYSEA Socket Map (APSMSKT 
Map) Database 
The APSMSKT Map Database is a per-system database that is used to 
map a particular user and session level to the MYSEA Socket (MSKT) Database assigned 
to provide APS support for that user/session-level pair.  The TPS Parent initializes the 
memory block that contains the database, and the TPS Child allocates an entry for each 
authenticated user.  The database is read by the SSS Child and APS processes to look up 
the MSKT Database handle to be used for socket communications between them. 
 
g. MYSEA Socket (MSKT) Database 
The MSKT Database is a structure used to pass data between TRSS and 
remote application processes, and between SSS Child and application protocol server 
processes.  Two instances of the database are initialized for each active user/session-level 
combination: one instance for RA support, and the other for APS support.  Because the 




databases, each database must be initialized at the security level of the untrusted process 
(i.e., at the session level of the remote user or remote application that requested the RA or 
APS invocation). 
Each entry in the MSKT Database contains the following fields: 
• Call Type: This field is used to indicate to the TRSS Parent or Child 
process what type of socket call is being requested by the remote 
application, or to indicate to the SSS Child process the type of socket 
call being requested by the application protocol server.  The supported 
socket calls are listed later in this section. 
• Data Buffer: This field is used to pass data between the TRSS Child 
and the RA, or between the SSS Child and the APS.  It is used for the 
read, recv, recvfrom, write, send, sendto, getsockopt, and setsockopt 
functions. 
• Function Return Value:  This field is used by the TRSS Child process 
to pass the return value of the function call to the RA, or by the SSS 
Child process to pass the return value of the function call to the APS. 
• MSKT FD: This field contains the socket file descriptor associated 
with the MSKT. 
• Untrusted PID:  This field contains the process ID of the untrusted 
process (i.e., the RA or APS) accessing the MSKT. 
• Trusted PID: This field contains the process ID of the trusted process 
(i.e., the TRSS or SSS Child) accessing the MSKT. 
• Other fields include an ‘In Use’ flag, an Errno field, a Parameter 
Buffer (only used by certain functions), and a Variable Buffer Flag 
that indicates whether the Data Buffer or Variable Shared Memory 
Buffer is being used to pass data. 
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The MSKT Module currently supports the following socket library 
function calls: accept, bind, close, connect, fcntl (to a limited extent), fork, getpeername, 
getsockname, getsockopt, ioctl (to a limited extent), listen, read, recv, recvfrom, select (to 
a limited extent), setsockopt, send, sendto, shutdown, socket, and write. 
For more detail on the implementation and current limitations of these 
function calls, see [3].  
 
h. Peer Level Database 
The Peer Level Database is a static, per-system database that is used to 
indicate whether a peer is multilevel, and if not, to associate the peer IP address with a 
specific security level.   
The database is used by TRSS Child and SSS Child processes to 
determine whether a connection requested by a RA or APS with a specific remote peer is 
allowable. 
 
i. Source Address Binding Database 
The Source Address Binding Database is a static, per-system database that 
is used to associate one or more destination IP addresses with a source IP address.  The 
need for this database arises from the fact that a remote connection must be registered in 
the Remote Connection Database in order for the SSS Parent to recognize it and handle 
incoming traffic for the connection appropriately.  In order to register a connection in the 
database, there must be known values for each of the following fields: source port, source 
IP address, destination port, and destination IP address.  This is problematic for certain 
socket calls, such as connect, that do not necessarily bind to a source IP address before 
attempting to establish a remote connection.   
To account for this, the TRSS Child process making the call on behalf of a 
remote application may consult the Source Address Binding Database to determine the 
appropriate source address to be used with the given destination address.  The database 
consists of pre-configured source IP addresses and their corresponding network masks 
and destination IP addresses.  The Source Address Binding Module provides an interface 
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for determining the correct source address for a given destination address.  This function 
iterates through each entry in its database, performing a bit-wise AND of the input 
destination address with the current entry’s network mask, and comparing the result with 
the masked destination address for that entry.  If there is a match, the function returns the 
source address associated with the entry. 
 
j. Cleanup Database2 
The Cleanup Database is a per-system database that maintains a list of the 
SSS Child processes that need to be terminated when a user changes session levels or 
logs out.  Each database entry contains two fields: an SSS Child process ID, and the 
associated TPE ID.  The database is initialized by the TPS Parent process; SSS Child 
processes enter themselves into the database as they are launched and remove themselves 
before they terminate.  Because they are trusted, inadvertent corruption of the database by 
SSS Child processes is not a concern. 
The TPS Child process refers to the Cleanup Database whenever a user 
logs out or changes session level.  It uses the TPE identifier to retrieve the process ID of 
each active SSS Child process associated with that TPE, and terminates those processes. 
 











 Allowed Protocols SSD Per-system  MLS LAN Yes No 
 Allowed TPE TPS Parent Per-system MLS LAN Yes No 
 User TPS Parent Per-system MLS LAN No Yes 
 Remote Connection TPS Parent Per-system MLS LAN No Yes 
 RAMSKT Map TPS Parent Per-system System-low No Yes 
 APSMSKT Map TPS Parent Per-system System-low No Yes 
                                                 
2 The Cleanup Database is currently undergoing re-design, and is not fully implemented at this time.  











 MSKT SSS Child 
and TRSS 
Parent 
Two per TPE 
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level (one for 





user or RA 
No Yes 
 Peer Level TPS Parent Per-system MLS LAN Yes Yes 
 Source Addr. Binding TPS Parent Per-system MLS LAN Yes Yes 
 Cleanup TPS Parent Per-system MLS LAN No Yes 
Table 3. Database Initialization Summary (after [3]) 
 
Table 4 summarizes the database access privileges required by each 
process.  An ‘R’ signifies that a process requires read access to the database; a ‘W’ 
signifies that the process requires write access to the database.  An asterisk indicates that 















































































 TPS Parent  R W R W R W R W R W  R W R W R W
 TPS Child   R W  R W R W    R 
 SSD R W          
 SSS Parent   R R       
 SSS Child      R RW R R R W















































































 TRSS Parent     R  RW    
 TRSS Child   R R W   RW R R  
 Remote App.*     R  RW    
Table 4. Process-Database Relations 
 
4. Other Modules 
a. Semaphore 
The Semaphore Module provides an interface for locking access to 
databases.  Databases are locked whenever necessary to prevent the occurrence of race 
conditions, i.e., the reading of a database by one process while a second process is busy 
writing to that database, which can lead to inconsistencies in the data presented to the 
reading process.  The MSKT, RAMSKT Map, APSMSKT Map, Remote Connection, and 
Cleanup Databases depend on this module. 
 
b. User Identification and Authentication 
The User Identification and Authentication (I&A) Module manages access 
to the XTS’s trusted services for user identification and authentication.  It is used by the 
TPS Child to check the validity of username/password and username/session-level 







The Privileges Module manages access to the XTS’s trusted services for 
granting and revoking privileges.  These privileges can enable the invoking process to do 
one or more of the following: 
• Bypass MAC and/or DAC controls. 
• Perform Identification & Authentication (I&A) checking. 
• Change the owner or group attributes of the current process. 
• Change the access class of an object. 
• Upgrade the mandatory access level of an object. 
• Read objects with a lower integrity. 
The module also provides the means to restore the invoking process’s 
previous set of privileges.  Only trusted applications that have been authorized for 
specific privileges in advance may take advantage of the functions offered by this 
module.  The SSD, SSS Parent and Child, TPS Parent and Child, and TRSS Parent and 
Child processes all make use of the module. 
 
d. Shared Memory 
The Shared Memory Module provides an intuitive interface for accessing 
shared memory on the XTS-400 system.  This module is used to facilitate the sharing of 
databases between processes. 
 
e. Utility 
The Utility Module provides an intuitive interface for several of the utility 
functions provided by the STOP OS, including the means to display and compare session 





f. MYSEA Synchronization 
The MYSEA Synchronization Module implements an intuitive interface 
for synchronization functions provided by the STOP OS.  Specifically, it provides the 
means for processes to signal each other and pause until signaled using the IPC message-
passing mechanism.  These functions are utilized in communications between the SSS 
and APS processes, and between the TRSS and RA processes. 
 
g. Socket Handler 
The Socket Handler Module presents the interfaces for the socket handler 
functions used by the TRSS and SSS Child processes to perform actual socket calls.  The 
results of the socket calls are passed back to the APS or RA by way of the MSKT 
Database. 
 
D. PRE-IMPLEMENTATION MODIFICATIONS TO DESIGN 
The design concepts discussed in this chapter were developed in a previous thesis 
[3], with a couple of exceptions.  Subsequent to the publication of the thesis, certain 
inefficiencies were identified in the use of the pseudo-socket layer and in the named-pipe 
method for inter-process communication.  These inefficiencies, and the design changes 
that resulted, are described in the following sections. 
 
1. MYSEA Sockets (MSKTs)  
The original design for remote application support called for the creation of a 
Remote Application Pseudo-Socket (RAPSKT) Database to be used by the TRSS and RA 
processes.  This database was to be distinct from the Pseudo-Socket (PSKT) Database 
already in use by the SSS and APS processes for the purpose of handling application 
protocol requests.  During the course of testing, it was noted that the performance of the 
application protocol servers degraded severely as the number of concurrent application 
protocol requests increased.  Rather than try to debug the pre-existing PSKT code, it was 
decided to use the RAPSKT interface to handle socket operations for both the application 
protocol servers and the remote applications.  This was possible because the two types of 
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databases served similar purposes: to pass socket requests and data between untrusted 
processes requiring access to the MLS LAN and the trusted processes authorized to make 
socket library calls on their behalf.  The database referred to throughout this document as 
the MSKT (MYSEA Socket) Database is equivalent to the RAPSKT Database described 
in [3], revised slightly to accommodate the requirements of the application protocol 
servers in addition to those of remote applications. 
 
2. Inter-Process Signaling 
The method for inter-process signaling between the RA and TRSS processes has 
also been revised since the publication of [3].  The TRSS processes can signal the RA 
process using the standard signaling mechanism, since the TRSS Parent and Child are 
trusted processes with the privilege to communicate with processes running at different 
levels.  However, the untrusted RA process cannot signal back to any process running at 
a different level than itself, requiring the introduction of an alternative signaling 
mechanism. 
The original design called for the RA process to signal the TRSS Parent and Child 
processes by way of named pipes.  This involved the creation of a named pipe by the 
TRSS process with a file name ending in its own process ID.  The TRSS process would 
wait for a signal by the RA by calling select on the file descriptor of the named pipe and 
waiting for the RA to write to the file.  When the RA first needed to communicate with 
the TRSS Parent or Child process, it would look up the TRSS process ID in the RAPSKT 
Database and write to the corresponding named pipe.  The TRSS process would then read 
the data from the file descriptor, respond to the RA using the standard signaling 
mechanism, and again call select on the file descriptor to wait for the RA’s next signal.  
The advantage of this method was that it seemed well-suited for the “lock-step” style of 
communication between the RA and TRSS processes: the RA is required to signal the 
TRSS Parent when it requires a new socket connection, and pause for the parent to 
respond with the results of the call; once the TRSS parent responds, the RA resumes 
processing and eventually signals the TRSS Child to handle the next socket operation, 
pausing for its response; the TRSS Child returns a value, and pauses for the RA’s next  
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signal; and the cycle repeats for each socket operation required by the RA thereafter. The 
named-pipe method is well-suited to handle this type of communication pattern, but it 
does have disadvantages:  
• It cannot be generalized to handle more complex communication models, 
possibly involving more than two processes or more than two states (currently 
sleep and awake); 
• It carries with it the inconvenience of having to create the named pipe and a 
deflection directory [13] in which to store it. 
For these reasons, it was decided to instead make use of the XTS-400 proprietary 
IPC (Inter-Process Communication) mechanism, or TCB messaging, packaged in an 
intuitive interface within the MYSEA Synchronization Module.  This method provides all 
the functionality of the named-pipe method, with the advantage that it is directly 
supported by the operating system and doesn’t require the special creation of named 
pipes or deflection directories. 
This change also applies to inter-process signaling between the SSS Child and 
APS. 
 
E. OVERVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS  
1. Newly Implemented Components 
a. Processes 
The following processes were implemented specifically for the purpose of 
remote application support: 
• TRSS Parent Process 
• TRSS Child Process 
• Remote Applications (tftp [14] and swget clients) 
• CGI Remote Application Invocation Scripts 




Additionally, the following databases were implemented specifically for 
the purpose of remote application support: 
• Remote Connection Database 
• RAMSKT Map Database 
• MSKT Database 
• Peer Level Database 
• Source Address Binding Database 
• Cleanup Database  
These six databases and their interfaces were implemented prior to the 
start of this thesis. 
 
c. Modules 
Finally, the following modules were implemented for the purpose of 
remote application support prior to the start of this thesis: 
• MYSEA Synchronization Module 
• Socket Handler Module 
 
2. Modifications to Existing Components 
Many of the components that are affected by the implementation of remote 
application support were previously designed and implemented [15], and existed for their 
own purposes outside the scope of remote application support.  These included the SSD, 
SSS, and TPS processes, as well as the Allowed Protocols, Allowed TPE, and User 
Databases. The majority of the modules described in Section C4 (all but the MYSEA 
Synchronization and Socket Handler Modules), also existed prior to this project.  
However, several of these pre-existing components underwent revision during the course 
of the project.  This included the adaptation of the SSS and APS processes to make use of 
the MSKT Database, as well as other minor revisions to the SSD, SSS Parent and Child, 
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and TPS Parent and Child processes, and to the User Database.  These revisions were 
largely aimed at improving cleanup processing, and are described in greater detail in [3]. 
 
F. SUMMARY 
The design specifications summarized in this chapter provide a complete 
framework for remote application support within the MYSEA environment.  An 
implementation based upon these requirements was completed for this project.  The 
implementation process, including module-specific implementation requirements and 





This chapter describes the implementation and modification of the remote 
application support components developed as part of this thesis.  These include 
modifications to the TPS Child process, the implementation of the TRSS Parent and 
Child processes, the development of two proof-of-concept remote applications (a TFTP 
client ported from publicly available source code, and a simple web client), and the 
implementation of two remote application invocation mechanisms in the form of CGI 
scripts.  This chapter also describes unforeseen issues that arose during the course of 
implementation, and other deviations from the specifications in [3].   
Within each of the following sections, a reproduction of the Process Overview 
figure (Figure 1) is presented as a reminder of the context in which the current RA 
component of interest was designed to function.  Lightly shaded boxes represent 
processes implemented during this project; darkly shaded boxes designate the 
components currently under discussion. 
Appendix A provides a listing of the MYSEA source code files that were created 
or modified for this project. 
 
B. DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 
The MYSEA remote application support code was developed on an XTS-400 
system running the STOP 6 operating system.  The MYSEA software, including the TPS 
and TRSS processes, was implemented in C and compiled using gcc 3.2, as were the 
proof-of-concept remote applications.  The CGI scripts were written in Perl and executed 
using Version 5.8.0 of the Perl interpreter.  Both the C compiler and Perl interpreter were 
the standard versions shipped with the XTS-400 system.  Remote application support was 





C. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
1. TPS Child Process 
 
 
Figure 2.   TPS Child in the Context of Remote Application Support 
 
The TPS Child process was implemented long before this project, but required the 
addition of new functionality in order to set the stage for remote application support for 
the particular TPE for which it was invoked.  Specifically, it was modified to take the 
following actions upon the successful establishment of a user session: 
1. Create a TRSS Parent process to handle socket requests from remote 
applications launched during the session; 
2. Allocate shared memory to be used for the MSKT Database for the session, 
and store the handle to the MSKT Database in the RAMSKT Map Database 
entry associated with the session; and 
3. Set the process ID of the newly created TRSS Parent process in the RAMSKT 
Map Database entry associated with the session. 
During the course of implementation, it was clarified that the successful 
establishment of a user session meant the invocation of the “run” command by the user 
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after having successfully logged in and negotiated a session level.  The specifications in 
[3] called for the execution of the above steps immediately following a successful user 
login; however, at this point, the user is still operating in the context of the Trusted Path 
and may elect to change his or her session level before running an untrusted session.  
Because the steps listed above depend on the previous determination of the user/session-
level pair for which the remote application support structures and processes should be 
initialized, they should be executed after the session level negotiations have been 
completed and the user exits the Trusted Path session.  Furthermore, the user may wish to 
re-invoke a Trusted Path session and re-negotiate the session level at a later point within 
the same login session.  In this case, the remote application support mechanism will only 
be functional for the re-negotiated session if it is re-initialized each time the user issues 
the “run” command after changing session levels, rather than being initialized only once 
after the user’s initial login. 
Before writing to the RAMSKT Map Database in Steps 2 and 3, the TPS Child 
must enable its MAC/DAC exemption privilege.  This is necessary because the TPS 
Child runs at the level of the MLS LAN, whereas the RAMSKT Map Database is a 
system-low database. (The TPS Parent must similarly enable its MAC/DAC exemption 
privilege before initializing the RAMSKT Map Database.) These requirements were 







2. TRSS Parent and Child Processes 
 
 
Figure 3.   TRSS Processes in the Context of Remote Application Support 
 
The TRSS Parent and Child processes, highlighted in Figure 3, were implemented 
specifically for the purpose of this project, per the specifications in [3].  In the interest of 
efficiency, a few deviations were made from the specifications: 
1. The TRSS Parent process does not loop while waiting for its MSKT Database 
handle to be successfully retrieved from the RAMSKT Map Database; 
instead, it sleeps until signaled by the TPS Child process that invoked it, 
indicating that the handle is ready to be retrieved. 
2. The TRSS Child process does not retrieve the process ID of the remote 
application to be serviced by performing an MSKT Database lookup; instead, 
it inherits the process ID from the TRSS Parent that forked it.  (The TRSS 
Parent is signaled by the remote application requiring service and records the 
process ID of the signaling process before it forks the TRSS Child.) 
3. The TRSS Child process does not retrieve the handle for the MSKT Database 
entry to be attended by doing a linear search for its own process ID in the 
MSKT Database; instead, it inherits the handle from the TRSS Parent that 
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forked it.  (The TRSS Parent locates the database entry containing a new 
socket call prior to forking the TRSS Child.) 
Furthermore, the following deviation from specifications was required for the 
proper functioning of remote applications: 
• The TRSS Parent, which normally runs as the network user, must switch to 
the user ID of the remotely authenticated user before initializing the MSKT 
Database.  This is because the MSKT Database is configured to be readable 
and writable only by its owner (i.e., by processes running with the same user 
ID as the process that initialized it), and untrusted remote applications running 
with the user ID of the remote user who invoked them must be able to access 
the database. 
The TRSS binary must be designated a trusted program with the specific 
privileges necessary for it to perform its duties.  This requires using the trusted tp_edit 
program provided by the STOP 6 operating system to designate the TRSS program as 
trusted, and to grant it the privileges it requires.  These include MAC/DAC exemption 
and the ability to set its user ID, as documented in Table 2.  Installation procedures for 












3. Remote Applications 
 
 
Figure 4.   TFTP Client and Swget in the Context of Remote Application Support 
 
To demonstrate the functionality of the newly implemented remote application 
support mechanism, two remote applications were installed on the MYSEA server: a 
Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) client ported from publicly available source code, 
and a simple web client (swget) developed specifically for use as a remote application on 
the MYSEA server.  The remote application component is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
a. Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) Client 
As one means of demonstrating the functionality of remote network-
enabled applications, a TFTP client was ported onto the MYSEA server and adapted to 
make use of the MYSEA socket (MSKT) mechanism.  This was accomplished by making 
the remote application modifications deemed necessary in [3].  Specifically, the TFTP 
client source code was modified to do the following: 
• Locate and attach to the MSKT Database that the client would be 
using for socket requests.  This required that the client take the 
following sequence of steps: 
1. Initialize access to the RAMSKT Map Database; 
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2. Retrieve the MSKT Database handle to be used by the remote 
application from the RAMSKT Map Database; and 
3. Initialize access to the MSKT Database. 
 
These steps had to be taken before any socket operations were 
attempted. 
 
• Use MSKT socket calls instead of their conventional equivalents (e.g., 
mskt_socket instead of socket, mskt_recvfrom instead of recvfrom).   
 
Successful execution of the TFTP GET command required use of the 
mskt_socket, mskt_bind, mskt_sendto, and mskt_recvfrom functions. 
 
• Detach from the RAMSKT Map and MSKT Databases when signaled 
by the TRSS Child process to terminate.   
 
This required the initialization of a sigaction structure and the 
definition of a signal handler function that detached from the 
RAMSKT Map and MSKT Databases before exiting.  The sigaction 
system call was used to specify that the process should respond to a 
SIGTERM (a signal to terminate) by calling its customized signal 
handler function. 
In order to integrate the TFTP client with the CGI invocation interface, 
additional client modifications were required.  Traditionally, TFTP has operated only in 
interactive mode; i.e., the user must enter separate commands to invoke the client (tftp), 
transfer files (get <remote_file_name> <local_file_name>), and terminate the client 
(quit).  For MYSEA RA testing purposes, it was necessary for the entire TFTP client 
invocation, file transfer, and client termination to be automated so that the transfer could 
be requested, and the results captured, by the execution of a single external command by 
a CGI script.  Using the tftp-0.41-hpa client (an enhanced version of the original BSD 
TFTP client) source code [14] as a baseline, only a few lines of code needed to be added 
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to main.c in order to implement a single new command (getq) that would retrieve a file 
and terminate the client process in sequence.  The getq command and its arguments 
could then be piped to the TFTP client application on the command line as shown: 
 
echo getq <remote_file_name> <local_file_name> | tftp <server_name> 
 
where the remote file name, local file name, and server name were all provided as user 
inputs to the CGI script.  The CGI script only needed to issue this single command to 
launch the TFTP client, download the file requested by the user, and place it in the 
directory requested by the user, meanwhile capturing the report of the transfer to be 
presented back to the user.  A successful invocation of the tftp getq command specified 
above results in output of the form: 
 
tftp> Received X bytes in Y seconds [Z bit/s] 
  
b. Web Client 
To demonstrate the functionality of remote applications interacting with a 
local web (APS) server, a simple web client was implemented for use on the MYSEA 
server.  The client was modeled after the text-based wget client widely used on Linux and 
UNIX platforms, but was designed to make use of MSKT socket calls.  Because it is 
much simpler than the popular wget client, the client implemented for the purpose of this 
project was named Simple wget, or swget.     
The swget client takes, as its single command-line argument, the URL of 
the web page to be retrieved, and parses the URL to determine the name of the server to 
be contacted and the name of the file to be retrieved from the server.  It then issues an 
“HTTP GET” command to port 80 of the requested server for the desired file name, 
stores the response from the web server, and filters the HTTP header information from 
the data received before printing it to STDOUT.  The result displayed to the user is the 
HTML markup content of the requested web page.   
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The swget client was developed for use as a proof-of-concept remote 
application.  Its practical use is limited, as it issues only a single HTTP request for the file 
specifically requested by the user.  Should that file include links to embedded 
components, such as images or sounds, those components will not be retrieved.   A port 
of a fully fledged web client such as wget is left for potential future work. 
 
4. CGI Remote Application Invocation Processes 
 
 
Figure 5.   CGI RA Invocation Processes in the Context of Remote Application Support 
 
Two distinct CGI interfaces were developed during this project as a means for 
invoking remote applications.  Each was designed to be platform-neutral, and may be 
accessed via a web browser on the MYSEA client.  The first interface takes the form of a 
command menu, from which the user may select the desired command (i.e., remote 
application) to be executed on the MYSEA server.  The second takes the form of a web 
shell, through which the user may enter UNIX-style commands to be executed on the 
server.  In each case, the output of the requested command is embedded in a web page 




a. Command Menu 
The command menu includes the options to perform simple tasks such as 
moving and copying files, changing directories, listing directory contents, and displaying 
the contents of text files.  It also includes the option to launch the TFTP or web client on 
the MYSEA server in order to request the transfer of a file onto the server.  A screen shot 
of the command menu is presented in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Command Menu 
 
User commands entered via the command menu are interpreted, and the 
corresponding UNIX commands executed on the MYSEA server, by a CGI script 
running on the server.  For example, a user may request a listing of files in the directory 
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test_dir by selecting the “List contents of directory” option from the command menu and 
typing the directory name test_dir in the corresponding text field.  The CGI script will 
then run the ls test_dir command on the server and report the results back to the user.   
The command menu interface has been implemented as a Perl script.  The 
major functions of the script are to: 
• Generate the initial command menu as an HTML form document; 
• Parse the command selections and arguments entered and submitted by 
the user via HTTP POST; 
• Perform sanitization and error-checking of user input; 
• Transform the user input into valid UNIX commands (ls, mv, cp, 
cd, tftp, or swget) with the appropriate command-line 
arguments; 
• Execute those commands on the server; 
• Capture any output generated by the commands on STDOUT or 
STDERR; and 
• Upon completion of each command, embed the captured output into an 
HTML page and present it back to the user.  In the case of a web page 
request, the requested page will replace the original command menu.  
In all other cases, the resulting web page will contain the original 
command menu followed by a report of the results of the user’s most 
recently executed command. 
 
The “Change Directory” command required special handling.  Because the 
corresponding UNIX command, cd, is not an actual binary to be executed but rather a 
built-in function of popular command-line shells (e.g., bash and csh) designed to 
influence the subsequent behavior of the shell, its functionality had to be implemented 
within the CGI script.  This was accomplished by calling Perl’s internal chdir function 
with the user-specified directory as an argument.  This allows the user to subsequently 
refer to files and directories by their relative paths from the current working directory 
rather than their absolute paths.  However, because the CGI scripts are inherently 
stateless (i.e., an entirely new CGI process is invoked for each command request 
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submitted by the user), the proper implementation of the cd command required the 
introduction of some mechanism to transfer the record of a previously requested current 
working directory across multiple invocations of the script.  To this end, a hidden form 
field containing the name of the current working directory was embedded within the 
command menu presented to the user after the completion of each command request.  
Whenever the script changes its current working directory, it also updates the value of 
this hidden form field.  When the user next submits the form, the CGI script retrieves the 
name of the user’s current working directory from the hidden field and calls chdir with 
the retrieved value as an argument before handling the user’s request.  If the user has not 
yet requested a cd operation, the current working directory is set to the user’s home 
directory, as specified in the “/etc/passwd” file on the MYSEA server.  If the user has 
been assigned no home directory, the current working directory defaults to the parent 
directory of the CGI script (“/home/http/cgi-bin/”). 
 
b. Web Shell 
The web shell was implemented based upon similar principles, but rather 
than requiring the user to select between pre-determined command options, it allows the 
user to enter arbitrary UNIX-style commands into a text field whose contents are 
interpreted as commands to be executed on the MYSEA server.  The output from the 
command execution is embedded into an emulated terminal window presented back to 
the user.  
Original plans called for the port of a pre-existing web shell such as the 
one made publicly available by the Gamma Group [16].  However, because the standard 
STOP 6 development environment lacked certain Perl modules required by the Gamma 
shell (namely, the Perl CGI Module, which automates certain CGI tasks), it was decided 
to implement a simple web shell from scratch.  The MYSEA web shell was implemented 
almost identically to the command menu, with the exception that user-requested 
commands are not checked against a list of valid commands, but are instead executed 
directly on the MYSEA server without intermediate interpretation.   




Figure 7.   Web Shell 
 
Although the web shell provides basic remote command-line functionality, 
it has significant limitations.  Most notably, any command entered by the user must 
terminate before the web shell will display its output.  This precludes the execution of 
interactive applications that prompt the user for input before displaying output or 
terminating.  (In some cases, a user may work around this restriction by making use of 
pipes, as in the TFTP client invocation method presented earlier in this chapter.)  The 
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reason for the limitation lies in the method used by the web shell to interact with remote 
applications.  The web shell CGI script makes use of Perl’s “backtick” method of 
spawning external programs and capturing their output; using this method, the CGI 
process must wait for its spawned child process to terminate before continuing its own 
processing.  For example, a Perl script containing the following line would execute ‘ls’ as 
a child process, wait for it to terminate, and copy its output from STDOUT to its own 
local $output variable: 
 
$output = `ls`; 
 
In practice, the command menu and web shell redirect STDERR to 
STDOUT and capture the combined output from both streams by appending “2>&1” to 
the user-supplied command, as in the following example: 
 
$output = `ls 2>&1`; 
 
The exit code from the child process is automatically stored in the $? 
variable.  This allows the CGI script to determine whether the remote application has 
executed successfully, and to display an error message to the user if not.  However, if the 
child process fails to terminate, so will the CGI script, and the user will receive no 
feedback. 
A second limitation of the web shell is its lack of support for environment 
variable management.  As previously discussed, the CGI script is inherently stateless, and 
any environment variable set manually by the user via the web shell will be forgotten 
with the next invocation of the script.  Memory of the current working directory across 
script invocations has been implemented as a special case; memory of the entire process 








D. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 
This section describes problems that were not specific to the implementation of 
any single remote application support module, but rather that emerged as unforeseen 
properties of the remote application support system as a whole. 
 
1. TRSS Access to Single-Level Network Interfaces 
MYSEA servers are intended to interface not only with an MLS LAN, but also 
with various external single-level networks; remote applications making use of the 
MSKT interface are intended to have access to any of the external networks that 
correspond to their current session level, as well as to the MLS LAN.  When connecting a 
MYSEA server to a single-level LAN, the security level of the network must be entered 
in the configuration data for the corresponding network interface on the server.  (When 
connecting the MYSEA server to the MLS LAN, the corresponding interface is 
configured to accommodate the highest level of data permitted to pass through the MLS 
LAN.)  Access to each network interface is monitored by a daemon running at the 
configured session level of the interface. 
In order for the TRSS Child process to access the MLS LAN interface, it must run 
at the level of the MLS LAN.  However, in order to support RA access to single-level 
networks, the TRSS Child must also be able to access network interfaces configured at 
lower levels.  Even with MAC/DAC exemption enabled, this capability is not supported 
by the STOP 6 operating system. 
Consequently, each interface on the MYSEA server must be configured at the 
level of the MLS LAN, regardless of the actual level of the connecting network.  The 
enforcement of session level restrictions in communication between hosts is thereby 
transferred from the domain of the STOP 6 operating system to that of the MYSEA 
software.  Specifically, the Peer Level Database must be correctly configured with the 
security levels of connected peers, and dutifully consulted by the TRSS Child before 




2. Trusted Parent Exemption 
According to the specifications in [3], the TPS Child process is to launch the 
TRSS Parent process by means of the xts_load_process function provided by the STOP 6 
operating system.  However, it was discovered during the course of implementation that 
trusted programs with privileges cannot be loaded in this manner unless the loading 
process has operator-level integrity.  Because the TRSS is a trusted program with 
privileges, and the TPS operates at the integrity level of the MLS LAN rather than 
operator integrity, the TPS failed to create the TRSS using the xts_load_process call..  
Three potential solutions were considered: 
1. Elevate the integrity level of the TPS process to operator integrity.  This was 
an undesirable option because it violated the principle of least privilege; the 
TPS had no need for such a high level of integrity. 
2. Implement the TRSS logic as a child process forked by the TPS Child, rather 
than as an external process loaded via xts_load_process.  This was undesirable 
for two reasons: 
a. The resulting program would need to be assigned the union of the 
privilege sets required by the TPS and the TRSS, also in violation of 
the principle of least privilege. 
b. The TPS Child and TRSS Parent access different databases and have 
very different duties.  The security engineering principles of data 
hiding and modularity therefore dictate that they be implemented 
separately. 
3. Grant the TRSS the Trusted Parent Exempt privilege.  This privilege allows it 
to be loaded by processes with less than operator-level integrity.  The 
disadvantage of this approach is that the TRSS process may now be launched 
by any untrusted program. 
After weighing each of the three options, it was decided that the third option was 
the most favorable.  The risk of unauthorized execution of the TRSS Parent process was 
mitigated by setting the DAC controls on the TRSS executable such that it was accessible 
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only by the admin user.  (The existence of rogue admin processes that might attempt to 
launch unauthorized TRSS processes was deemed acceptably improbable.)  Because the 
TPS Child process runs as admin, it is able to launch the TRSS process as desired, while 
non-admin processes are denied access. 
 
3. Multiple Binds  
As discussed in Chapter III, any external connection established by a remote 
application must be registered in the Remote Connection Database in order for the SSS 
Parent to recognize it and handle incoming traffic for the connection appropriately.  In 
order to register a connection in the database, it must have a known source port, source IP 
address, destination port, and destination IP address.  This is problematic for certain 
socket calls, such as connect and sendto, that may be called on a socket that has not yet 
been bound to a source port and IP address.   
To account for this, the TRSS Child process determines the appropriate source 
address to be used for a given destination address by consulting the Source Address 
Binding Database.  It then makes the bind call on behalf of the remote application each 
time it requests an mskt_connect or mskt_sendto call. 
This solution is imperfect, because when a bind call is requested for a socket that 
has been previously bound, subsequent bind calls for that socket fail.  The specifications 
in [3] call for the mskt_connect and mskt_sendto functions to short-circuit their 
processing and return an error if their internal bind call fails, even if the failure is due to 
the fact that the socket was previously bound.  This prevents remote applications making 
use of more than one instance of any of the mskt_bind, mskt_connect, or mskt_sendto 
functions from successfully completing their requested socket operations.   
As a temporary solution, bind call failures with an errno of EINVAL (the error 
code returned when a socket has been previously bound) are ignored within the 
mskt_connect and mskt_sendto functions.  This allows the functions to continue their 
processing and the RA socket operations to succeed.   
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For future work, a record should be maintained as to whether each socket entered 
in the MSKT Database has yet been bound.  If a socket has already been bound, then 
subsequent bind calls on that socket should not be attempted. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
With the implementation of the components discussed in this chapter, remote 
application support in the multilevel MYSEA environment was enabled.  Chapter V 
describes the developmental tests performed on each remote application support 
component implemented for this project, as well as the acceptance tests performed to 
ensure that the integrated remote application support system fulfilled its top-level user 




This chapter describes the developmental and acceptance test plans designed to 
verify the proper functioning of the newly implemented RA support components.  Three 
systems are utilized during testing: a remote-application-enabled MYSEA server, a Red 
Hat Linux system hosting a TFTP server, and a Windows XP client equipped with a Java 
TPE and web browser.  Figure 8 depicts the setup of the test network. The MYSEA 
server has two network interfaces: one configured to connect to the MLS LAN on which 
the Windows client is located, and the other configured to connect to a single-level LAN 
housing the TFTP server.  The single-level network is meant to simulate an external LAN 
that might operate at any one of various session levels; this level must be specified in the 
Peer Level Database on the MYSEA server.  The network interfaces themselves are both 
configured at the level of the MLS LAN (at the maximum security level and integrity 




Figure 8.   Test Network Topology 
 
The developmental and acceptance test plans and results are discussed at a general 
level in this chapter; specific test procedures are documented in Appendix C. 
 
B. DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING 
The purpose of developmental testing is to test the functionality of each of the 
components of remote application support implemented or modified as part of this thesis.   
 
54 
These include the TRSS Parent and Child processes that execute socket calls on behalf of 
remote applications, the CGI scripts that invoke the remote applications, and the remote 
applications themselves. 
Reproductions of the Process Overview figure (Figure 1) are presented again 
within each of the following sections as a reminder of the context in which each RA 
component of interest was designed to function. 
 
1. Trusted Remote Session Server (TRSS) 
 
 
Figure 9.   TRSS Processes in the Context of Remote Application Support 
 
The purpose of the first test suite is to verify that the TRSS Parent and Child 
processes correctly handle the complete set of MSKT socket calls that may be requested 
by a remote application.  Although the functionality of the TRSS processes is tested 
implicitly in later tests of the remote application support system as a whole, this test suite 
is the only one to provide complete coverage of supported MSKT socket calls. 
For these tests, an MSKT-enabled test server is remotely invoked on the MYSEA 
server via the web shell, and a local client is launched on the MYSEA server to interact 
with the test server.  Although both client and server run on the MYSEA server, only the 
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server runs as a remote application and makes use of MSKTs.3  The client presents a 
menu of user-selectable options, each of which causes specific MSKT socket operations 
to be exercised by the server.  The mskt_socket, mskt_bind, and mskt_close calls are 
exercised implicitly.  Together, the tests exercise every one of the supported MSKT 
socket calls.   
Note that this test suite was designed to test only the logic implemented 
specifically within the TRSS Parent and Child source code, and not to test the previously 
implemented RA support databases and modules that the TRSS processes depend on.  
The formal test documentation for these components is provided in [17]. 
The client and server used for testing were implemented prior to the start of this 
thesis, and were used for this test suite almost entirely without modification.  The single 
change required was in the “Miscellaneous testing” function, which was designed to test 
the mskt_getpeername, mskt_getsockname, mskt_getsockopt, mskt_setsockopt, mskt_fcntl, 
and mskt_ioctl calls.  The mskt_ioctl function takes as its first and second parameters a 
file descriptor and an integer representing an action to be taken on that file descriptor.  To 
ensure that the function could be handled without error on the part of the TRSS Child, a 
valid ioctl action request for XTS-400 network sockets had to be supplied.  (The ioctl 
request made by the original test server returned a value of -1 when applied to XTS-400 
network sockets.  This was not useful, because an mskt_ioctl return value of -1 does not 
distinguish a failure of the ioctl call from a failure of the TRSS Child process.)  With 
some experimentation, it was determined that the ioctl FIONREAD request could be 
successfully applied to network sockets on the XTS-400, and the test server was modified 
to make this request. 
For the mskt_ioctl call to be properly tested in the future, the test server should be 
modified so that the actual functionality of the FIONREAD request (and all other 
supported types of mskt_ioctl socket requests) may be verified.  All that matters for the 
purposes of TRSS testing is that the mskt_ioctl call returns without an error, indicating 
                                                 
3 The current design for remote application support allows for the possibility of either client or server 
RAs running on the MYSEA server, although the client RA would seem the more natural case.  The server 
RA used in this test suite exercises all of the supported client-side socket calls as well as all of the server-
side socket calls, and is therefore ideally suited to the task of testing the TRSS processes’ handling of the 
full range of MSKT socket calls.  
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that the TRSS Child has successfully received the request from the test server, made the 
ioctl call on its behalf, and returned the result.  Whether the ioctl call itself functions as 
intended is beyond the scope of TRSS testing. 
In the following test suite table, the “Action” column indicates the menu option 
selected within the client application for each test case, and the “RA” column specifies 
the process running as the remote application (the test_socket_ra server in this test suite).  
Both the client and the server generate reports as the tests are run; output constituting a 
success for each test case is documented in Appendix C. 





Test Type Action RA Expected 
Result 
a1 read Test mskt_read test_socket_ra Success 
a2 write Test mskt_write test_socket_ra Success 
a3 select Test mskt_select test_socket_ra Success 
a4 listen Test mskt_listen test_socket_ra Success 
a5 accept Test mskt_accept, 
mskt_connect 
test_socket_ra Success 
a6 shutdown Test mskt_shutdown test_socket_ra Success 
a7 send Test mskt_send test_socket_ra Success 
a8 sendto Test mskt_sendto test_socket_ra Success 
a9 recv Test mskt_recv test_socket_ra Success 
a10 recvfrom Test mskt_recvfrom test_socket_ra Success 
a11 fork Test mskt_fork test_socket_ra Success 
a12 Blocked 
I/O 















Table 5. TRSS Testing 
 
2. CGI Invocation of Remote Applications 
 
Figure 10.   CGI RA Invocation Processes in the Context of Remote Application Support 
 
The purpose of this test suite is to verify the functionality of the CGI mechanism 
for executing remote applications.  Each of the two CGI interfaces is tested: the web 
shell, which allows users to enter arbitrary UNIX-style commands to be executed on the 
server, and the Windows-style command menu, which allows users to select desired 
actions from a list.  In each case, the CGI interface is invoked via a web browser on the 
MLS client, and the CGI script and requested command are executed on the MYSEA 
server. The output of the command is returned via a web page back to the client. 
The CGI RA Invocation processes are highlighted within the context of remote 
application support in Figure 10. 
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a. Web Shell Functional Testing 
Functional testing of the web shell is meant to verify that the shell may be 
used to successfully invoke user-specified remote applications on the MYSEA server and 
report the results back to the user.  Testing should also verify that the remote application 
is executed at the session level and with the user ID of the remotely authenticated user.  
Because the change-directory (cd) command is implemented as a special function of the 
CGI script and not executed directly as a remote application, it is tested explicitly.  
These tests are performed by logging in to the MYSEA server from the 
MLS client, running a session, navigating to the URL of the web shell, and interacting 




Test Type Action RA Expected 
Result 
b1 Web shell directory-
listing check 
List contents of a 
directory via the web 
shell 






via the web shell 





listing check after change-
directory 
List contents of 
current directory via 
the web shell 




b3 Web shell user ID check Check user ID via 
the web shell 
whoami User ID 
entered by the 
user at login is 
displayed 
b4 Web shell session-level 
check 
Check session level 
via the web shell 
mysea_level Session level 
previously 
negotiated by 
the user via 
the TPE is 
displayed 




b. Web Shell Exception Testing 
The purpose of exception testing is to verify that the web shell does not 
demonstrate unintended behavior when presented with unexpected or ill-formed user 
input.  This may include an accidental request to invoke a remote application that does 
not exist, or an attempt to “break” the script by manually forging form input names or 
values.  Testing should verify that the web shell is functional even after being provided 
with invalid input. 
To demonstrate more concretely the purpose of this test suite, an excerpt 








This excerpt encodes an HTML form with a single input name/value pair, 
namely, an input entitled “cmd,” which takes the form of a text box and has no pre-set 
value.  When a user types a command into the text box and submits the form, the string 
he or she enters in this text box becomes the value of the “cmd” input.  When the CGI 
script on the server is invoked, it parses the user input into name/value pairs, searches for 
the input entitled “cmd,” and interprets the corresponding value to be the name of the 
remote application the user wishes to execute.   
There are three main possibilities for error in this setup.  First, the user 
may enter an invalid remote application name as the value of the “cmd” input.  Test c1 
verifies that the CGI script prints an informative error message and returns a new, 
functional shell in this case.   
The second possibility is that the user may enter no value for the “cmd” 
input.  Test c2 verifies that the CGI script re-displays the original web shell in this case. 
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The final possibility is that the user may submit a form without a “cmd” 
input at all, and possibly with some other input type instead.  Note that this is different 
from simply leaving the “cmd” text field empty and submitting the form; in that case, the 
script still receives the “cmd” name/value pair, but the value is null.  In the present case, 
the script does not receive a “cmd” name/value pair at all. 
The choice to implement the CGI scripts using the HTTP POST method, 
rather than HTTP GET, was made in an attempt to minimize the possibility of this third 
type of error occurring by accident.  Forms implemented using the HTTP GET method 
reveal their input name/value pairs in their URLs.  For example, after entering “ls” in the 
“cmd” field of the web shell, the new URL displayed in the address bar would take the 
form http://servername/cgi-bin/webshell.cgi?cmd=ls.  It would be easy for an 
adventurous but non-malicious user to alter the input name/value pairs by manually 
editing the URL, and to do so in a way that was unexpected by the CGI script.  Using the 
HTTP POST method hides the input names and values from the user, so that in order to 
submit an invalid input name or omit an expected input name, the user would have to 
manually edit the web shell source HTML or write a special-purpose client to interact 
with the CGI script, neither of which is likely to be accidental.  
Test c3 verifies that the submission of an invalid form input name/value 
pair in place of the expected “cmd” input does not result in unintended behavior by the 
web shell.   By design, the script searches only for the value of the “cmd” input and re-
prints the original shell if no such value is be found.  Since we have established that this 
type of error is not likely to happen by accident, informative error reporting is not as vital 





Test Type Action RA Expected 
Result 
Invalid web shell command 
(i.e., invalid value for 
“cmd” input field) 
Attempt to 
execute a non-
existent RA via 
the web shell 






Web shell functionality 
check after invalid input 
List contents of a 
directory via the 
web shell 




web shell is 
still functional 
Empty web shell command 
(i.e., null value for “cmd” 
input field) 
Leave “cmd” 
field empty and 
submit form 




Web shell functionality 
check after invalid input 
List contents of a 
directory via the 
web shell 




web shell is 
still functional 
Invalid form input name 
instead of expected “cmd” 
Submit request 
with manually 
forged form input 
name instead of 
expected “cmd”  
(none) New command 
prompt is 
returned with 
no output from 
invalid request 
c3 
Web shell functionality 
check after invalid input 
List contents of a 
directory via the 
web shell 




web shell is 
still functional 
Table 7. Web Shell Exception Testing 
 
c. Command Menu Functional Testing 
The purpose of the command menu functional testing is to verify that the 
command menu interface may be used to successfully invoke remote applications 
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selected by the user from a list and report the results back to the user.  Each of the options 
presented in the menu is tested.  Because the command menu CGI script is invoked using 
exactly the same mechanisms and trusted processes as the web shell, explicit verification 




Test Type Action RA  Expected 
Result 
d1 Command menu directory-
listing check 
List contents of a 
directory via the 
command menu 
ls Contents of 
directory are 
displayed  
d2 Command menu file-contents-
display check 
Display contents of 
a text file via the 
command menu 






via the command 
menu 





listing check after change-
directory 
List contents of 
current directory via 
the command menu 




Command menu move check Move a file via the 
command menu 
mv Move request 
is confirmed 




listing check after move 
List contents of 
directory containing 
moved file via the 
command menu 




not its old 
location 
d5 Command menu copy check Copy a file via the 
command menu 
cp Copy request 
is confirmed 





Test Type Action RA  Expected 
Result 
Command menu directory-
listing check after copy 
List contents of 
directory containing 
the copied file via 
the command menu 






d6 Command menu web check Request a web page 
via the command 
menu 
swget Requested 
web page is 
displayed 
Command menu TFTP check Issue TFTP GET 
request via the 
command menu 
tftp TFTP reports 




display check after TFTP 
Display contents of 
requested file via 
the command menu 
cat Contents of 
requested file 
are displayed 
Table 8. Command Menu Functional Testing 
 
d. Command Menu Exception Testing 
The purpose of exception testing is to verify that the command menu does 
not demonstrate unintended behavior when presented with unexpected or ill-formed user 
input.  This may include attempts to execute unlisted remote applications or to “break” 
the script by manually forging form input names or values as described earlier in this 
chapter, or by supplying specially crafted, non-alphanumeric command-line arguments as 
form inputs.  To prevent users from executing unsupported remote applications (e.g., by 
appending a semi-colon to a command argument and following it with a new command, 
which a normal shell would interpret as two separate commands), the CGI script verifies 
that command arguments contain only the following types of characters: letters, numbers, 
slashes, periods, underscores, and dashes.   
The following tests verify that the command menu is functional even after 





Test Type Action RA Expected Result 
Invalid command (i.e., 
invalid form input 
value for “cmd” input 
field) 
Attempt to execute an 
unsupported RA via 
the command menu 
(none) “Illegal input” 





after invalid input 
List contents of a 
directory via the 
command menu 




command menu is 
still functional 
Empty command (i.e., 
null form input value 
for “cmd” input field) 
Select no option and 
submit form 
(none) New command 




after invalid input  
List contents of a 
directory via the 
command menu 




command menu is 
still functional 
Invalid form input 
instead of expected 
“cmd” 
Submit request with 
manually forged form 
input name instead of 
expected “cmd”  
(none) New command 
menu is returned 






after invalid input 
List contents of a 
directory via the 
command menu 
















after invalid input 
List contents of a 
directory via the 
command menu 









Test Type Action RA Expected Result 
Incorrect number of 
arguments 
Attempt to move a 
file without 
specifying source and 
destination locations 
mv Error-handling is 
delegated to RA 





after invalid input 
List contents of a 
directory via the 
command menu 




command menu is 
still functional 
Table 9. Command Menu Exception Testing 
 
3. Remote Applications 
 
 
Figure 11.   TFTP Client and Swget in the Context of Remote Application Support 
 
The purpose of this test suite is to verify the functionality of the proof-of-concept 
remote applications installed on the MYSEA server.  These include a publicly available 
TFTP client altered to use MSKT socket calls, and a simple web client (swget) that uses 
MSKT socket calls to retrieve requested web pages.  In this test suite, the remote 
applications are invoked using the web shell. 
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Once again, this test suite was designed to test only the logic implemented or 
added specifically to the remote application source code.  It was not meant to 
exhaustively test the implementation of the databases and modules that the remote 
applications depend on. 
The RA processes are highlighted within the context of remote application 
support in Figure 11. 
 
a. TFTP Client Functional Testing 
The purpose of the TFTP client functional testing is to verify that the 
MSKT-enabled TFTP client can be used to successfully transfer files from a TFTP server 
using the TFTP GET request.  It should also verify that the file transfer and termination 
of the TFTP client can be accomplished via a single command-line instruction, 
functionality that was added for the purpose of easily integrating the TFTP client with the 
CGI remote application invocation mechanism.  In this test, the user requests a file 
transfer via the web shell, and verifies that the requested file was successfully transferred 
into the specified directory on the MYSEA server.  The file is then displayed to ensure 




Test Type Action RA Expected 
Result 
Issue TFTP GET 
request via web shell 







Display file (specifying 
the local path included 
in the original TFTP 
request) 






Table 10. TFTP Client Functional Testing 
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Because the TFTP client is based on publicly available software, 
exception testing is omitted here.   
 
b. Web Client Functional Testing 
The purpose of the web client (swget) functional testing is to verify that 
the MSKT-enabled web client can be used to successfully transfer files from an HTTP 





Test Type Action RA Expected Result 
g1 Valid web page 
request with HTTP 
prefix 
Request valid URL 
with “http://” prefix 
swget Markup content 
of requested web 
page is displayed 
g2 Valid web page 
request without 
HTTP prefix 
Request valid URL 
without “http://” 
prefix 
swget Markup content 
of requested web 
page is displayed 
Table 11. Web Client Functional Testing 
 
c. Web Client Exception Testing 
Exception testing of swget is designed to verify that the program provides 
informative error messages when a requested file cannot be retrieved or when provided 





Test Type Action RA Expected Result 
h1 Too few 
command-line 
arguments 
Invoke swget with 
no command-line 
arguments. 
swget Usage error 
message is 
displayed 
h2 Too many 
command-line 
arguments 
Invoke swget with 
two command-line 
arguments. 














unavailable file from 
an available server. 
swget Server error 
message is 
displayed 
Table 12. Web Client Exception Testing 
 
 
C. DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING RESULTS 
Developmental testing of the CGI scripts revealed no unforeseen problems.  The 
scripts did not need to be tailored for the XTS-400 or MYSEA software, and were 
straightforward to implement and test. 
Developmental testing for the TRSS processes and remote applications was 
slightly more revealing, with a handful of factors contributing to initial failures: 
• The problems described in Chapter IV regarding TRSS access to single-level 
networks, socket call failures due to multiple binds, and xts_load_process failures 
were unanticipated and required investigation. 
• Minor bugs in previously implemented, but untested MYSEA remote 
application support modules had to be pinpointed and corrected.   
• Because the cleanup mechanisms for remote application support were still in 
the design phase and not fully implemented, the presence of stale processes and 
data structures meant that the server daemons often had to be restarted, or the 
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MYSEA server rebooted entirely, between each test.  (Cleanup issues are 
discussed in more detail in the “Future Work” section of Chapter VI.)  
Furthermore, each time a change was made to the source code of a trusted 
program, it not only had to be recompiled, but the trusted binary replaced and (if 
applicable) the daemon restarted.  This made it a very time-consuming process to 
correct problems and re-run tests. 
Once these initial stumbling blocks were surmounted, developmental testing 
successfully demonstrated the functionality of each of the components implemented as 
part of this project.  The results of all test suites, including those testing the TRSS Parent 
and Child processes, the CGI remote application invocation mechanisms, and the MSKT-
enabled TFTP and swget clients, were as expected.  Detailed test results are provided in 
Appendix C. 
 
D. ACCEPTANCE TESTING 
The goal of acceptance testing is to verify that the newly implemented remote 
application components are able to successfully interact with each other in such a way 
that the top-level user requirements for remote application support are fulfilled.  These 
requirements, first stated in Chapter III B, are as follows: 
1. The RA shall be able to communicate with the local MLS server, a remote 
MLS server and a RA server.   
2. The remote application shall be appropriately bound to the authenticated 
user’s session.  Specifically, the RA process shall run with the user ID and at 
the current session level of the authenticated user. 
3. The user shall be able to launch the RA from the client. 
4. The MLS server shall be able to support both Unix/Linux and Microsoft 
Windows clients. 
5. The design shall only require a minimal number of changes to the RA. 
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Of these, requirements 2 and 3 are demonstrated to be fulfilled in developmental 
testing, and requirements 4 and 5 are fulfilled by design. (Although our testing is 
conducted from a Windows client, there is no reason to believe that results would differ 
for a Unix/Linux client, since remote application invocation is accomplished via a 
platform-neutral web page.)  This leaves only the first requirement, which specifies three 
test cases: 
1. Communication between a remote application and an external single-level 
server.   
2. Communication between a remote application and the local MLS server. 
3. Communication between a remote application and a remote MLS server. 
 
Of these, the first and second test cases are described in this section; the third test 
case was determined to be unrealizable in the current MYSEA environment, and is 
described in the “Future Work” section of Chapter VI. 
The purpose of the functional acceptance testing is to verify that in Test Cases 1 
and 2, the remote applications are able to successfully retrieve the requested data, with 
the stipulation that the user making the request must be logged in at an allowable session 
level relative to the peer hosting the files (or the files themselves, if hosted on a 
multilevel server). 
The purpose of the exception testing is to verify that file transfer requests that are 
not allowable under the Bell-LaPadula security model or the Biba integrity model are in 
fact denied.   
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1. Communication between an RA and an External Server 
 
 
Figure 12.   RA Request to External Server 
 
Acceptance Test Case 1 involves communication between a remote application 
and an external, single-level server.  It verifies that a remotely invoked TFTP client 
running on the MYSEA server is able to successfully request data from a single-level 
peer if the level of the peer is equal to the session level of the requesting user, but not 
otherwise.  This tests the proper configuration of the Peer Level Database and its use by 
the TRSS Child process in determining whether to allow the requested sendto and 
recvfrom socket calls.   
Because a successful file request and transfer involves two-way information flow 
between the client and server, both the simple security policy and the security-* property 
of the Bell-LaPadula model apply in determining whether a file request will succeed.  
The simple security policy limits allowable object (peer) security levels to those less than 
or equal to the security level of the subject, while the security-* property limits allowable 
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peer levels to those greater than or equal to the security level of the subject.  The STOP 6 
implementation of the security-* property further limits allowable objects levels to those 
exactly equal to the security level of the subject.  Taken together, these properties restrict 
the security level of the requesting user to precisely the security level of the peer hosting 
the requested file.  The simple integrity policy and integrity-* property of the Biba 
integrity model similarly restrict the integrity level of the requesting user to precisely the 
integrity level of the peer hosting the requested file.  However, integrity-level checking 
has not yet been implemented in the Utility Module access functions relied upon by the 
TRSS Child, and is therefore not tested here. 
In this test suite, a user logged in to the MYSEA server from a client on the MLS 
LAN remotely invokes the TFTP client and requests the transfer of test files from an 
external TFTP server to the MYSEA server.  The RA-related processes involved in this 
interaction are depicted in Figure 12.  The test network topology from Figure 8 is 




Figure 13.   Network Components Involved in Acceptance Test Case 1 
 
a. Acceptance Test Case 1 Functional Testing 
Functional testing for this test case verifies that the TFTP file request is 
successful when the security level of the user’s current session is equal to the security 
level of the TFTP server.  For this test, the TFTP server is registered at the sl1:il3 level in 
the Peer Level Database, and the user logs in to the MYSEA server at the same level.  
The user then requests the transfer of a sample text file from the TFTP server to the 
MYSEA server and displays the contents of the transferred file. 





























cat Contents of 
requested file 
are displayed 
Table 13. Acceptance Test Case 1 Functional Testing 
 
b. Acceptance Test Case 1 Exception Testing 
Exception testing for this case verifies that the TFTP file request fails if 
the security level of the user’s current session is not equal to the security level of the 
TFTP server, or if the security level of the TFTP server is unknown.  For each of the tests 
in this suite, the TFTP server is registered in the Peer Level Database at a security level 
different from the user’s current session level (or is not registered in the database at all).  
In these cases, the user’s file transfer request should result in an error message and the 







Test Type User 
Session 
Level 













































cat File contents 
are empty 
Table 14. Acceptance Test Case 1 Exception Testing 
                                                 
4 The TFTP client opens the local target file for writing before it even attempts to make a socket 
connection, so an empty file is created even if the connection is disallowed. 
75 
2. Communication between an RA and a Local APS 
 
 
Figure 14.   RA Request to Local APS via SSS  
 
Acceptance Test Case 2 verifies that a remotely invoked web client running on 
the MYSEA server is able to successfully request data from a web server (httpd) running 
as an APS on the same system.  This tests the proper configuration of the Peer Level 
Database and its use by the TRSS Child Process in determining whether to allow the 
requested socket connect call.  In this case, the Peer Level Database should indicate that 
the peer is multilevel, and the TRSS Child Process should therefore allow the connection.   
This test case also verifies the proper configuration and use of the Remote 
Connection Database by the SSS Parent and TRSS Child processes.  Before the TRSS 
Child may establish connections on behalf of remote applications, it is required to register 
those connections in the Remote Connection Database.  The SSS Parent refers to the 
database when attempting to validate an incoming request (such as a web page request) 
that does not originate from the TPE of an authenticated user.  If the connection is found 
in the Remote Connection database, the SSS Parent retrieves the session level and user 
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ID associated with the connection in the database and the SSS Child creates an APS 
process to service the request.  The APS process is created at the same session level and 
with the same user ID as the registered remote connection, and is therefore subject to the 
same access control restrictions as the requesting user as it attempts to access web pages 
of various security and integrity levels.  These tests will verify that remote connections 
and their corresponding session information are being successfully entered and retrieved 
from the Remote Connection Database.  The RA-related processes involved in this 
interaction are depicted in Figure 14. 
In this test suite, a user logged in to the MYSEA server from a client on the MLS 
LAN remotely invokes a web client and issues web page requests to the local web server. 
Tests are conducted via both the command menu and the web shell.  When requesting a 
web page via the command menu, an HTML-rendered version of the requested page is 
displayed in lieu of the original menu; when making the request via the web shell, the 
raw markup of the requested file is displayed within the emulated terminal window. 
The network components involved in this test case are depicted in Figure 15. 
 
 
Figure 15.   Network Components Involved in Acceptance Test Case 2 
  
a. Acceptance Test Case 2 Functional Testing 
Functional testing for this test case should verify that a remote user may 
launch a web client on the MYSEA server which is able to successfully request a local 
web page via the SSS.  The test also verifies that the instance of the web APS invoked to 
handle the requests runs at the session level and with the user ID of the requesting user.  
Because the APS is untrusted, its session level and user ID limit the files it is able to read 
to those allowable under the MAC and DAC policies of the STOP 6 operating system; 
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this has been demonstrated outside of the scope of remote application support and is 
therefore not formally demonstrated here. 
In this test suite, the user requests a dynamically generated web page that 
displays the current session level and user ID of the CGI (and therefore, the APS) process 
that generated it, along with the server IP address, the IP address of the requesting host, 
and the time of the request.  This information is used to verify that the web request 
received by the APS was generated by the MYSEA server and not by the remote client, 



























address is that of 
MYSEA server; 
session level of 

















address is that of 
MYSEA server; 
session level of 
process is sl3:il3  
Table 15. Acceptance Test Case 2 Functional Testing 
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b. Acceptance Test Case 2 Exception Testing 
Exception testing for this case verifies that the web page request fails if 
the MYSEA server was not registered in its own Peer Level Database as being an MLS 
peer.  For this test, the MYSEA server administrator removes the record from the 
database, and a user requests a web page from the MYSEA server via the command 
menu.  The request should result in a connection error message, and the web page should 




Test Type User 
Session 
Level 













Table 16. Acceptance Test Case 2 Exception Testing 
 
E. ACCEPTANCE TESTING RESULTS 
The results of the acceptance tests were as expected, successfully demonstrating 
that remote applications are able to communicate with local MLS servers and external 
single-level servers when such communications do not violate the access control policies 
of the multilevel environment.  With the exception of the third envisioned usage scenario 
(communication between RAs and remote MLS servers, left for future work), acceptance 
testing has demonstrated that the current implementation of the remote application 
support mechanism meets the top-level user requirements documented in [3].  Detailed 
test results are provided in Appendix C. 
 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the developmental tests performed on each remote 
application support component implemented for this project, and the acceptance tests 
performed to ensure that the integrated remote application support system fulfills its top-
level user requirements.  All tests were successful.   




This project has enhanced the usability of the MYSEA architecture by providing 
users the ability to execute server-resident applications from diskless MYSEA clients.  
Specifically, the project has involved the implementation of the following remote 
application support components: 
1. The Trusted Remote Session Server (TRSS) processes responsible for making 
socket calls on behalf of untrusted remote applications; 
2. Two distinct Common Gateway Interface (CGI) interfaces for invoking 
remote applications from a client web browser: 
a. A command menu, from which a user may select desired remote 
applications to be executed on the server;  
b. A web shell, through which a user may enter UNIX-style commands to 
be executed on the server. 
3. Two simple network-enabled remote applications: 
a. A TFTP client, adapted from publicly available source code [14]; 
b. A web client, developed specifically for use as a remote application on 
the MYSEA server. 
This project has also involved the development and execution of a test plan to 
verify the functionality of the newly implemented remote application support 
components.  Testing has successfully demonstrated the functionality of each component 
and of the remote application support system as a whole. 
 
B. ANALYSIS OF THESIS QUESTIONS 
Two research questions were posed at the beginning of this project: 
1. What modifications to the existing design are necessary to successfully 
implement remote application support on the MYSEA server? 
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2. What additional functionality, if any, is required to support the remote 
execution of specific desired applications? 
The answer to the first question is that surprisingly few modifications were 
required.  The specifications developed in [3] were sufficiently detailed and thorough that 
a newcomer to the project was able to pick up where the designer left off and implement 
a functional remote application support system without significant difficulties.  The 
refinements that were required fell into two main categories: 
• Privilege and access issues specific to the STOP 6 operating system.  These 
are issues that would have been difficult to foresee without actually 
attempting an implementation.  Issues that fell under this category included: 
o The inability of the TRSS process to access single-level network 
interfaces configured at levels lower than itself.  One might reasonably 
have assumed that enabling MAC/DAC exemption on the part of the 
TRSS process would solve the problem, but this was not the case. 
o  The inability of the TPS Child process to load the TRSS Parent 
process without assigning the TRSS process the Trusted Parent 
Exemption.  It would have been difficult to anticipate the restriction 
against the invocation of privileged processes by processes below 
operator-level integrity without specifically searching the 
documentation for such restrictions. 
• Issues involving connectionless protocols.  Remote applications that make use 
of connectionless protocols such as UDP do not necessary call close or 
shutdown on their sockets at the end of data transfer sessions.  The author of 
[3] identified one potential consequence of this fact: connections that are 
entered in the Remote Connection Database when these applications make 
their mskt_sendto calls may remain in the database as “zombie” entries, since 
it is normally the mskt_close and mskt_shutdown calls that prompt the 
removal of the entries from the database.  Two other issues involving 
connectionless protocols were identified during this project: 
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o Socket call failures due to multiple binds.  bind is called internally for 
every mskt_bind, mskt_connect, and mskt_sendto call requested by a 
remote application; binding the same socket more than once will result 
in the failure of all bind calls after the first, and of the MSKT socket 
calls in which they are attempted.  This prevents remote applications 
making use of more than one instance of any of the mskt_bind, 
mskt_connect, or mskt_sendto functions from successfully completing 
their requested socket operations.  While this might not be a problem 
for TCP clients that make a single connect call followed by only send 
and recv calls, or for TCP servers that make a single bind call followed 
by listen, accept, and send calls, it is extremely problematic for UDP 
clients that typically make repeated sendto calls, since each one after 
the first will fail.  A temporary fix was implemented for this project, 
but a more robust solution (such as the one suggested in Chapter IV) 
should be implemented for future work. 
o Zombie TRSS processes.  A TRSS Child process should not live longer 
than the remote application that it was invoked to serve.  Under the 
current specifications, the TRSS Child process terminates when its 
remote application calls mskt_close or mskt_shutdown on its final open 
socket.  However, if the remote application uses a connectionless 
protocol and never makes either of these calls, the TRSS Child will 
continue running on the server as a zombie process.  The same 
potential issue exists for SSS Child processes, which should not live 
longer than the APS processes that they serve.  (On the flip side, a 
remote application may close its final socket but still have a significant 
amount of processing left to do; it does not necessarily make sense for 
the TRSS Child to terminate it as soon as it has closed its final socket.  
This issue is being addressed separately) 
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This leads us to the second question: what additional functionality is required to 
support the remote execution of specific desired applications?   
For the purposes of this project, none.  A TFTP client and simple web client were 
each successfully adapted for use as remote applications using the precise instructions 
provided in [3].   There were, in the case of the UDP-based TFTP client, issues with 
zombie TRSS processes, but the clients were otherwise functional.  Cleanup issues in 
general will need to be addressed in future work. 
Because the applications ported for this project were relatively simple, it is 
possible that problems will emerge for more complex applications – those that make use 
of unsupported ioctl or fcntl calls, for example.  There is also the question as to how best 
to handle remote applications that make library calls which in turn make socket calls, 
since these socket calls cannot be mapped to their MSKT equivalents by simply editing 
the source code of the remote applications.  These are important issues for future work. 
 
C. FUTURE WORK 
Additional areas for future work include the following: 
 
1. Federated Server Environment 
The top-level user requirements for remote application support, documented in 
[3], specify that a remote application should be able to make APS requests to a remote 
MYSEA server.  However, the SSS Parent process that validates incoming APS requests 
was designed to accept only two types of connections: those originating from users 
logged in to the server via a TPE, and those originating from a remote application 
executing on the server.  When the SSS Parent receives a request, it checks for the 
requesting entity in the User and Remote Connection Databases, and if it does not find a 
record of it in either database, it drops the connection.  
When a remote connection makes an outgoing connection request, it is entered 
into the Remote Connection Database on the server on which it executes; the remote 
application may therefore make APS requests of the local server, and the SSS Parent can 
verify that the requests originate from a valid remote application.  However, if the remote 
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application attempts to make a connection with a remote MYSEA server, that server will 
have no record of the connection request in its own Remote Connection Database, and 
the SSS Parent will drop the request.  It is therefore impossible in the current MYSEA 
environment for a remote application to communicate with an APS on a remote MYSEA 
server.   
Visions for the future include a federated server environment, in which MYSEA 
servers will share databases containing information about authenticated users and remote 
connections.  In this environment, connections registered in the Remote Connection 
Database by one MYSEA server will be readable by remote MYSEA servers.  This will 
enable the SSS Parent process to validate requests originating from remote applications 
executing not just on its own server, but on any federated MYSEA server. 
 
2. Stress Testing 
The very nature of remote application support creates the potential for a 
performance bottleneck at the server hosting the remote applications.  In the current 
implementation of remote application support on the MYSEA server, several of the 
databases shared between remote application support processes are locked by the process 
accessing them, in order to prevent race conditions.  This could exacerbate performance 
bottleneck issues.  Affected databases could include the RAMSKT Map, APSMSKT 
Map, MSKT, Remote Connection, and Cleanup Databases.  Stress testing should be 
performed to check for performance degradation as the number of simultaneous users and 
APS and RA requests increases. 
 
3. Cleanup 
When a user logs out or changes session level, the data structures and processes 
that provided remote application support for the user’s previous session should be purged 
from the server.  This is necessary so that structures from the previous session are not re-
used after the user has requested a change in session level, and so that “zombie” data 
structures and processes do not continue to utilize resources on the server after they have 
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out-lived their usefulness.  Specifically, the following remote application support 
structures and processes should be purged at the end of a user session: 
1. RAMSKT Map Database entry5 
2. APSMSKT Map Database entry 
3. User Database entry 
4. MSKT Databases5 
5. SSS Child processes 
6. APS processes 
7. TRSS Parent5 and Child processes 
8. RA processes 
Furthermore, a TRSS Child process should not live longer than the remote 
application that it was invoked to serve.  The same is true of SSS Child processes, which 
should not live longer than the APS processes that they were invoked to serve.  This issue 
was discussed in Section B of this chapter. 
Cleanup mechanisms are currently in the design phase, and are a major area for 
future work. 
 
4. Unauthorized Channels 
The RAMSKT Map and APSMSKT Map Databases are system-low databases, 
accessible to remote applications and application protocol servers running at all security 
levels.  This is necessary because all RAs and APSs must be able to look up the handle of 
the MSKT Database to be used for their socket communications.   However, because 
applications running at all security levels use the same database, there exists the 
possibility of a covert channel.  This issue was identified in [3] and remains unresolved. 
 
 
                                                 
5 The RAMSKT Map Database entry, MSKT Database used for RA communications, and TRSS 
Parent process should only be purged at the end of the user session if the user has no other open sessions at 
that session level. 
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5. Interactive Remote Application Support 
The remote applications developed for this project were very simple programs 
meant to demonstrate proof-of-concept functionality of the remote application support 
mechanism.  In a realistic environment, more sophisticated remote applications will be 
desired.  This may include interactive and even graphical remote applications, both of 
which are unsupported by the current CGI remote application invocation mechanism.  To 
enable the execution of interactive text-based remote applications, a telnet-like APS 
could take the place of the CGI web shell.  Its role would be similar to that of the web 
shell: to relay input received from the user to a remote application on the server, and 
output from the remote application back to the user, but with the difference that its 
connection would be persistent.  Thus, unlike the CGI web shell, it could relay 
communications back and forth between the application and user multiple times over the 
same socket connection.  A special-purpose application would need to be developed on 
the MYSEA client side in addition to the server side in order to support this type of 
communication. 
To enable graphical remote application support, a network-based windowing 
system such as X-Windows could be ported to the MYSEA environment.  This is one of 
the more exciting prospects for future remote application support. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The need for high-assurance architectures that implement multi-domain 
information protection mechanisms is widespread and growing.  However, such 
architectures will not be adopted unless they provide users with currently required 
functionality, the ability to easily incorporate new applications and software updates, and 
a familiar interface.  The implementation of remote application support on the MYSEA 
server has contributed to the overall usability of the MYSEA architecture by allowing 
users logged in from diskless clients to execute server-resident applications using only a 
web browser.  The use of remote applications increases the ease of application 
configuration and maintenance, and relieves constraints caused by the potentially limited 
amounts of RAM and lack of non-volatile storage available on the diskless clients.  It is 
hoped that the development of high-assurance, highly usable MLS architectures such as 
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MYSEA will encourage the adoption of MLS computing systems by government, 
military, and business organizations that stand to benefit from their use of such systems.   
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APPENDIX A: SOURCE CODE LISTING 
This appendix provides a listing of the internal MYSEA source code files that 
were modified or created for this project.  Of these, the files implementing the Trusted 
Remote Session Server (TRSS), the swget client, and the CGI remote application 
invocation mechanisms were created from scratch.  The files implementing the TFTP 
client were adapted from publicly available source code [14], but were new to the 
MYSEA distribution; these files are indicated with an asterisk.  Files implementing 
various other MYSEA components, including the Trusted Path Server (TPS), Secure 
Session Server (SSS), RAMSKT Map Database, Source Address Binding Database, and 
Socket Handler Module, existed in previous MYSEA distributions but were modified 
during this project; these files are indicated with a double asterisk.  Remote application 
support was integrated into the February 3, 2006 (1.1x) version of the MYSEA server 
software. 
 











































APPENDIX B:  INSTALLATION PROCEDURES 
The purpose of this appendix is to describe the installation procedures for the 
remote application support components developed during this project.  These include the 
Trusted Remote Session Server (TRSS), the TFTP and swget clients, and the CGI remote 
application invocation mechanisms.  
The following instructions include references to the Secure Attention Key (SAK).  
On the XTS-400 console, these are the “Alt” and “Print Screen” keys pressed 
simultaneously.  When instructed to set the security and integrity levels, the user should 
issue a SAK followed by the sl command, then enter the desired security and integrity 
levels at the prompts. 
The user should be logged in to the MSYEA server as admin for all of the 
following steps. 
 
A. CONFIGURE MYSEA DAEMONS 
For the purposes of remote application support, all active network interfaces must 
be configured at the level of the MLS LAN and serviced by a single daemon.  This will 
affect the following steps within the NIC TCP/IP parameter configuration section of the 
normal MYSEA installation procedures: 
1. In the tcpip_edit step, only the tcpip_mls daemon must be created.  When 
asked whether to add another network interface entry for the daemon, type y 
and supply the parameters for each active network interface.  If the tcpip_mls 
daemon has been previously configured to service only the MLS interface, it 
should be re-configured as follows: 
(Set security and integrity levels – min:max) 
SAK 
Enter command? tcpip_edit 
 change 
  tcpip_mls  for Enter daemon name 
  <CR>   for Enter TCP/IP daemon description 
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  <CR>   for Modify the TCP/IP parameters 
  y   for Modify network interface configuration 
  add 
   /dev/ether1 for Enter TCP/IP device name? 
   192.168.10.1 for Enter interface address? 
   0.0.0.0  for Enter destination address? 
   192.168.10.255 for Enter broadcast address? 
   255.255.255.0 for Enter network mask? 
  exit   to return to the previous menu 
  <CR>   for Modify the route configuration? 
  <CR>   for Modify the resolver configuration? 
 exit – to leave tcpip_edit 
 
(If configuring remote application support for a network architecture other 
than the test architecture described in Chapter V, repeat this process for each 
active network interface besides /dev/ether0 and /dev/ether1.) 
 
2. In the daemon_edit step, only the tcpip_mls daemon must be created.  If 
daemons such as tcpip_nipr, tcpip_sipr, or tcpip_coin have been previously 
configured to service single-level networks, they should be disabled as 
follows: 
(Set security and integrity levels – min:max) 
SAK 
Enter command? daemon_edit 
 change 
  <daemon_name> for Enter daemon name 
<CR>   for all prompts but the following: 
  n    for Start daemon at startup    
 exit – to leave daemon_edit 
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Repeat for each single-level daemon.  A list of configured daemons may be 
retrieved by issuing the list command within daemon_edit.  All but the 
tcpip_mls, tps_udpd, and ssdd daemons should be disabled. 
 
3. In the sda step, each interface should be configured at the level of the MLS 
LAN (max:il3): 
(Set security and integrity levels – max:max) 
SAK 
Enter command? sda 
 Enter device?      /dev/ether1 
 Enter new device security level and categories?  max 
 Enter new device integrity level and categories?  il3 
 Modify discretionary access?     n 
 Is access correct?      y 
 
(If configuring remote application support for a network architecture other 
than the test architecture described in Chapter V, repeat this process for each 
active network interface besides /dev/ether0 and /dev/ether1.) 
 
B. BUILD MYSEA BINARIES 
The mysea.tar file contains already built object code and executables.  Issuing the 
make_all.sh command during the normal MYSEA installation process will remove 
and regenerate all of the MYSEA executables, including the newly implemented remote 
application support components.  The following instructions describe how to remove and 
regenerate these components individually. 





















C. CONFIGURE TRSS AS A TRUSTED PROGRAM 
The TRSS executable must be designated a trusted program and granted specific 
privileges in order to function properly.  This may be accomplished using the tp_edit 
program provided by the STOP 6 operating system.  The following steps are required: 
(Set security and integrity levels – min:max) 
SAK 
Enter command? tp_edit 
cd 
cd 
cd –  make sure in /trusted directory 
add 
   trss    for name 
 /usr/local/mysea/bin/trss for path 
   <CR>    for max integrity 
 <CR>    for min integrity 
   y    for assign privileges 
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   <CR>    for all privileges but the following: 
   y    for Set owner/group 
   y    for Simple security exempt 
   y    for Security star property exempt 
   y    for Simple integrity exempt 
   y     for Integrity star property exempt 
   y    for Discretionary access exempt 
   y    for Trusted parent exempt 
exit – to leave tp_edit 
 
Now use fsm to set the permissions on the trusted executable: 
(Set security and integrity levels – min:max) 
SAK 
Enter command? fsm 
cd 
/trusted    for path 
change 
 trss    for name 
 N    for Modify access level 
 <CR>    for new owner & group 
 y    for discretionary access 
 rwx    for owner 
 <CR>    for username 
 none    for group 
 <CR>    for group name 
 none    for other 
 N    for display object 
 Y    for OK to change? 





D. SET UP CGI SCRIPTS 
The CGI remote application invocation scripts must be placed within the web 
server’s cgi-bin directory.  The following steps should be taken only after the /home/http 
directory has been created and populated during the course of the normal MYSEA 
installation: 
(Set security and integrity levels – sl0:il3) 
SAK 
Enter command? run 
cp /usr/local/mysea/cgi-bin/* /home/http/cgi-bin/ 
 
E. ENABLE DEBUGGING 
Optionally, the TRSS Parent and Child processes may be configured to print 
debug statements to a log file by uncommenting the “DEBUG_OSS = -DDEMO” line 
within the TRSS Makefile: 
(Set security and integrity levels – sl0:il3) 
SAK 
Enter command? run 
  cd /usr/local/mysea/trss 
  edit Makefile 
   Uncomment the line “DEBUG_OSS = -DDEMO” 
 
 The TRSS binary must now be re-compiled: 
  make clean 
  make 
 
Additionally, the trusted TRSS binary must be replaced using tp_edit: 
(Set security and integrity levels – min:max) 
 SAK 
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Enter command? tp_edit 
cd 
cd 
cd –  make sure in /trusted directory 
  change 
   Enter program name  trss   
   Replace program file [N] y 
   Enter pathname:  /usr/local/mysea/bin/trss 
   Enter maximum integrity: <CR> 
   Enter program name  <CR> 
   Enter minimum integrity <CR> 
   Change privileges [N]  <CR> 
exit – to leave tp_edit 
 
Debugging logs will be created in the /tmp directory at the level of the TRSS 
processes (max:il3).  Logs created by the TRSS Parent will have names of the form 
trsspar_X.tmp, where X is the process ID of the parent; logs created by the TRSS Child 
will have names of the form trsschild_Y.tmp, where Y is the process ID of the child. 
Debugging may be disabled by re-commenting the appropriate line in the 
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APPENDIX C:  TEST PROCEDURES 
The purpose of this appendix is to document the test procedures used in the Test 
Plan presented in Chapter V.  Steps should be taken to ensure that the following 
preconditions are met before testing: 
• The test network connecting the MYSEA server, MYSEA client, and external 
single-level server is set up as illustrated in Chapter V, Figure 8 (“Test 
Network Topology”).  
• The mdemo1 account exists on the MYSEA server with default session level 
sl1:il3, maximum session level at least sl3:il3, and home directory 
/home/mdemo1/. (Following the standard MYSEA installation instructions 
will ensure this.) 
• /home/mdemo1/ exists as a deflection directory on the MYSEA server.  To 
create the directory, take the following steps: 
(As admin, set the security level to min:max) 
SAK 
fsm 
mkdir   for Enter request 
  /home/mdemo1 for Enter the directory to create 
  y   for Should this be a deflection directory 
  rwx   for Enter directory modes for owner 
  <CR>   for Enter user name for specific permission 
  rx   for Enter directory modes for group 
  <CR>   for Enter group name for specific permission 
  rx   for Enter directory modes for others 
  deflect  for Enter request 
  y   for Disable deflection 
  change  for Enter request 
  /home/mdemo1 for Enter pathname 
  n   for Modify access level 
  mdemo1  for Enter new owner name 
  other   for Enter new group name 
  n   for Modify discretionary access 
98 
  n   for Display the object 
  y   for Okay to change 
  exit – to leave fsm 
 
• /home/mdemo1/ contains a text file entitled test.txt at security level sl1:il3.  
The file is readable by user mdemo1, and contains the single line: 
 Test file at sl1 il3 (SIM_UNCLASSIFIED). 
 
Create this file as follows: 
(As mdemo1, set security and integrity levels – sl1:il3) 
SAK 
Enter command? run 
   edit /home/mdemo1/test.txt 
    Add the line specified above. 
 
• The Allowed TPE, Source Address Binding, and Peer Level Databases on the 
MYSEA server are configured as described below.  The user should edit the 
specified configuration files as admin while running a session at level sl0:il3. 
o The Allowed TPE Database configuration file 
(/usr/local/mysea/tpe_list) contains the following single entry: 
# TCBE ID  Comment 
192.168.0.31 Java TPE 
o The Source Address Binding Database configuration file 
(/usr/local/mysea/sa_bind) contains the following entries and no 
others: 
# DestinationIP SourceIP  Netmask 
192.168.0.0 192.168.0.38 255.255.255.0 
192.168.10.0 192.168.10.1 255.255.255.0 
o The Peer Level Database configuration file (/usr/local/mysea/peer_lvl) 
contains the following entries and no others, unless indicated 
otherwise by specific test procedures: 
# PeerIP  MLS_flag  PeerLevel 
192.168.0.38  0   
192.168.10.1  1  sl1 il3 
192.168.10.2  1  sl1 il3 
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• The single-level server is running an externally accessible TFTP server, which 
contains in its /tftpboot directory the file tftp_test.txt.  This file is world-
readable and contains the following content: 
Test file from 192.168.10.2. 
 
o To set up the TFTP server on the Red Hat Linux system plutodemo, 
take the following steps: 
1. Open /etc/xinetd.d/tftp  
2. Set “disable” to “no” (if it is not already) 
3. Click the Red Hat menu icon 
4. Select “System Settings” 
5. Select “Server Settings” 
6. Select “Services” 
7. Check “xinetd” 
8. Click “Start” (or “Restart” if the process is already running) 
9. Create tftp_test.txt in /tftpboot (if it does not exist already) 
• The single-level server is running an externally accessible web server, which 
contains in its /var/www/cgi-bin directory a world-readable and world-
executable CGI script named ra_demo.cgi.  This script may be found in the 
cgi-bin directory contained within mysea.tar if it is not already installed on the 
single-level server.  The server’s /var/www/html directory should not contain 
a file called nosuchfile.html. 
o To set up the web server on the Red Hat Linux system plutodemo, take 
the following steps: 
1. Click the Red Hat menu icon. 
2. Select “System Settings” 
3. Select “Server Settings” 
4. Select “Services” 
5. Check “httpd” 
6. Click “Start” (if the process is not already running) 
7. Place ra_demo.cgi in /var/www/cgi-bin (if it is not there already) 
8. Ensure that the /var/www/html directory does not contain a file 
called nosuchfile.html 
 
Once these preconditions are met, testing may begin.  The following test suites 
may be performed individually or in sequence.  Unless otherwise indicated, the MYSEA 
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daemons should be running on the server prior to the start of each test.  To start the 
daemons on the server: 
1. As admin, set the security level to max:max. 
2. SAK 
3. Start the daemons: 
 startup 
 
The operating system should report that the tcipip_mls, tps_udpd, and ssdd 
daemons were started successfully. 
For each of the following tests, unless otherwise indicated, the user should be 
logged in as mdemo1 via the Java TPE on the MYSEA client and have an active session 
running.  The session level should remain at the default (SIM_UNCLASSIFIED, i.e., 
sl1:il3) unless a specific test step describes otherwise.  To run a session from the client: 
 
1. Launch the Java TPE application by double-clicking the “tcbe” icon on the 
desktop. 
2. Set the remote IP address to that of the MYSEA server (192.168.0.38) and 
press Enter. 
3. Click the “SAR” button. 
4. At the login prompt, type “mdemo1” and press Enter. 
5. At the password prompt, type the password for mdemo1 and press Enter. 
6. Click the “SAR” button. 
7. Type “run” and press Enter. 
8. To access the web interfaces specified in the following test suites, launch the 








A. TRSS TESTING 
Compile the test client and server on the MYSEA server, if necessary: 
1. As admin, set the security level to sl0:il3 and issue the run command. 
 
2. Navigate to the test directory:  
cd /usr/local/mysea/test 
 
3. Compile the test client:  
make test_socket_client 
 




Initialize the connection between the test client and server: 
From the MYSEA client: 
5. Navigate to the MYSEA server web shell by entering 
http://192.168.0.38/cgi-bin/webshell.cgi in the “Address” 
field of the web browser. 
6. Invoke the test server as a remote application by entering 
/usr/local/mysea/test/test_socket_ra in the “Command” field 
of the web page and clicking the “Enter” button. 
The web page should become blank while waiting for output from the 
remote application. 
 
From the MYSEA server: 
7. As admin, set the security level to max:il3 and issue the run command. 
8. Issue the startx command.  (This will ensure that results printed to the 
screen by the client are readable in full.) 
9. Invoke the test client: 
/usr/local/mysea/test/test_socket_client  
A menu of commands should be displayed. 
10. Select option Z and set both default IP addresses to 192.168.0.38. 
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11. Select option 1 to connect to the test server.  Accept the default IP address 
to connect to (192.168.0.38).  The client should report that a connection 
was established. 
12. To perform test steps a1-a13, select the menu option corresponding to the 
type of testing specified for each step in the table below.  Whenever 
prompted for an IP address, accept the default (192.168.0.38).  Whenever 
prompted for a number of bytes, enter 32.  When prompted for a port 
number, start with 2000 and increment by one for each port request. 
 
The results for each test step should include the output provided in the “Expected 
Results Summary” column of the table below.  For a complete record of the observed 




Menu selection Port Expected Results Summary 
a1 2  - Do read testing N/A error 0 
a2 3  - Do write testing N/A error 0 
a3 4  - Do select testing 
- NON_BLOCKING 
N/A error 0 
a4 5  - Do listen testing 2000 error 0 
a5 6  - Do accept 
testing 
2001 error 0 
a6 7  - Do shutdown 
testing 
2002 error 0 
a7 8  - Do send testing N/A error 0 
a8 9  - Do sendto 
testing 
2003 error 0 
a9 A  - Do recv testing N/A error 0 
a10 B  - Do recvfrom 
testing 
2004 error 0 




Menu selection Port Expected Results Summary 
a12 D  - Do Blocked I/O 
testing 
2005 error 0 
a13 E  - Do Misc testing 2006 
---fcntl(F_GETFD) - 0--- 
error 0 
---fcntl(F_GETFL) - 2--- 
error 0 
---fcntl(F_SETFD) - 0--- 
error 0 
---fcntl(F_SETFL) - 0--- 
error 0 
---getpeername - 192.168.0.38--- 
error 0 
---getsockname - 192.168.0.38--- 
error 0 
---getsockopt(KEEPALIVE) - 0--- 
error 0 
---setsockopt(KEEPALIVE) - 1--- 
error 0 
---ioctl – FIONREAD - 0--- 
error 0 
 
From the MYSEA client: 
13. After the tests have been completed, verify that the web page is still blank, 
indicating that the remote application server is still running.  Had the 
TRSS Child been unable to handle any of the server’s MSKT socket calls, 
both processes would have terminated and a new web shell would have 
been displayed. 
 
From the MYSEA server: 
14. Select menu option 0 to exit.  The client should report, “Test is complete.” 
 
From the MYSEA client: 
15. Verify that the browser window once again displays the web shell, 





B. WEB SHELL FUNCTIONAL TESTING 
From the client TPE, verify that the current session level is 
“SIM_UNCLASSIFIED” by pressing the “SAR” button and issuing the “session” 
command. 
Navigate to http://192.168.0.38/cgi-bin/webshell.cgi.  Enter each of the following 
commands in the “Command” field, clicking “Enter” after each one.  The expected 





Command Expected Result 
b1 ls test.txt 









b3 whoami mdemo1 
b4 /usr/local/mysea/tools/mysea_level SIM_UNCLASSIFIED 
 
Close the browser window before proceeding to the next test suite. 
 
C. WEB SHELL EXCEPTION TESTING 
Open a new browser window and navigate to http://192.168.0.38/cgi-






Command Expected Result 
fakecmd No such file or directory c1 
ls test.txt 
(None – click “Enter”) (New shell; no new output) c2 
ls test.txt 
(Follow instructions below.)  (New shell; no new output) c3 
ls test.txt 
 
For test c3, part 1: 
1. Save the web shell as an .html file.  Open the file in a text editor and make 
the following changes: 
a. Within the <form> element, add: 
action=http://192.168.0.38/cgi-bin/webshell.cgi 
b. Within the <input> element, change cmd to fakeinputname. 
2. Open the modified file in the web browser. 
3.  Type ls in the “Command” field, and click “Enter”.   
 
D. COMMAND MENU FUNCTIONAL TESTING 
Navigate to http://192.168.0.38/cgi-bin/simple_cmd_win.cgi.  Select each of the 
following menu options, clicking the “Execute” button after each one.  An empty “Arg” 
entry in the table below indicates that the default input value should be deleted from the 
text field and left empty.  Otherwise, the default value should be replaced with the value 
indicated in the table.  A grayed-out “Arg” entry signifies that the command menu does 
not have a corresponding text field. 
The expected results listed below will be displayed below the “Current directory” 
indicator, except in the case of the web page request in test d6.  In this case, the web page 
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will replace to command menu.  To return to the command menu for the test d7, click the 




Menu selection Arg 1 Arg 2 Arg 3 Expected Result 
d1 "List contents 
of directory" 
   Contents of directory: 
test.txt 
d2 "Display 
contents of file" 
test.txt   Contents of file test.txt: 




/var   (“Current directory” 
indicator lists “/var” as 













   (“Current directory” 
indicator lists 













test1.txt test.txt  Copying file from 




   Contents of directory: 
test.txt 
test1.txt 















tftp> Received 30 bytes 
in 0.1 seconds [1665 
bit/s] 
(bit rate may differ) 
d7 
"Display 
contents of file" 
/tmp/test
_d7.txt 
  Contents of file 
/tmp/test_d7.txt: 
Test file from 
192.168.10.2. 
 
The output from test d6 should be a web page containing the following text.  (The 
“Current time” value will differ.) 
 
 
Demonstration of MYSEA Remote Application Support 
 
This is a sample web page. 
 
Web page request received from 192.168.10.1. 
Web page served by 192.168.10.2. 
Current time is Tue Mar 7 09:44:01 PST 2006. 
 
 
After completing this test suite, delete the file test1.txt from /home/mdemo1, 
either via the web shell or directly on the MYSEA server. 
 
E. COMMAND MENU EXCEPTION TESTING 
Navigate to http://192.168.0.38/cgi-bin/simple_cmd_win.cgi.  Select the menu 
option listed for each test in the table below, clicking the “Execute” button after each one.  














   Contents of 
directory: 
test.txt 





















a;b   Illegal input: ls a;b e4 
"List contents 
of directory" 





   Moving file from  to 
mv: missing file 
argument 









For test e1, part 1: 
1. Save the command menu as an .html file.  Open the file in a text editor and 
make the following changes: 
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a. Within the <form> element, add: 
action=http://192.168.0.38/cgi-
bin/simple_cmd_win.cgi 
b. Within the <input type=radio name=cmd value='ls' …> 
element, change ls to fakecmd. 
2. Open the modified file in the web browser. 
3. Select the "List contents of directory" option with no argument, and click 
“Execute.” 
For test e3, part 1: 
1. Save the command menu as an .html file.  Open the file in a text editor and 
make the following changes: 
a. Within the <form> element, add: 
action=http://192.168.0.38/cgi-
bin/simple_cmd_win.cgi 
b. Within the <input type=radio name=cmd value='ls' …> 
element, change cmd to fakeinputname. 
2. Open the modified file in the web browser. 
3. Select the "List contents of directory" option with no argument, and click 
“Execute.” 
 
F. TFTP CLIENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING 
Navigate to http://192.168.0.38/cgi-bin/webshell.cgi.  Issue the following 








Command Expected Result 




tftp> Received 30 bytes in 0.0 
seconds [5336 bit/s]  
(bit rate may differ) 
f1 
cat /tmp/test_f1.txt Test file from 192.168.10.2. 
 
G. WEB CLIENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING 
Navigate to http://192.168.0.38/cgi-bin/webshell.cgi.  Issue the following 













For each of these tests, the following HTML markup should be displayed.  (The 
“Current time” value will differ.) 
 
<html> 
<head><title>Remote Application Support Demo</title></head> 
<body> 
<table border=0 cellpadding=2 cellspacing=0 width=800> 
<tr><td><table border=1 cellpadding=4 cellspacing=0 width=100%> 
<tr><td> 
<table border=0 cellpadding=2 cellspacing=0 width=100%> 
<tr bgcolor=#88bbee align=center> 
<td><font size=+3><b> 











<font size=+1>Web page request received from 192.168.10.1.</font> 
</td></tr> 
<tr align=center><td> 
<font size=+1>Web page served by 192.168.10.2.</font> 
</td></tr><tr align=center><td> 






H. WEB CLIENT EXCEPTION TESTING 
Navigate to http://192.168.0.38/cgi-bin/webshell.cgi.  Issue the following 




Command Expected Result 
h1 /usr/local/mysea/swget/swget Usage: swget [URL] 
h2 /usr/local/mysea/swget/swget arg1 arg2 Usage: swget [URL] 
h3 
 










For test h4, the following HTML markup should be displayed: 
 
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML 2.0//EN"> 
<html><head> 
<title>404 Not Found</title> 
</head><body> 
<h1>Not Found</h1> 
<p>The requested URL /nosuchfile.html was not found on this server.</p> 
<hr /> 
<address>Apache/2.0.40 Server at <a 
href="mailto:root@localhost">192.168.10.2</a> Port 80</address> 
</body></html> 
 
I. ACCEPTANCE TEST CASE 1 FUNCTIONAL TESTING 
Navigate to http://192.168.0.38/cgi-bin/simple_cmd_win.cgi.  Execute the 











tftp> Received 30 
bytes in 0.0 seconds 
[8677 bit/s] 
(bit rate may differ) 
i1 
"Display 
contents of file" 
/tmp/test
_i1.txt 
  Contents of file 
/tmp/test_i1.txt: 
Test file from 
192.168.10.2. 
 
J. ACCEPTANCE TEST CASE 1 EXCEPTION TESTING 
The following tests involve the re-configuration of the Peer Level Database on the 
MYSEA server.  For each test, take the following steps: 
Close all open browser windows on the MYSEA client. 
On the MYSEA server: 
(As admin, set security and integrity levels – sl0:il3) 
SAK 
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Enter command? run 
edit /usr/local/mysea/peer_lvl 
Configure the peer level of the host 192.168.10.2 to the value specified in 
the “Peer Level” table below.  If the value is “Undefined,” comment the 
entry out of the database file by adding a # to the beginning of the line. 
(Set security and integrity levels – max:max) 
SAK  
stop_daemon 
ssdd     for Enter daemon name 
tps_udpd    for Enter daemon name 
<CR> – to leave stop_daemon 
SAK 
start_daemon 
tps_udpd    for Enter daemon name 
ssdd     for Enter daemon name 
<CR> – to leave start_daemon 
 
Now log in as mdemo1 from the MYSEA client, run a session at the default 
session level (sl1:il3), open a browser window, and navigate to http://192.168.0.38/cgi-





Peer Level Menu 
selection 
























Peer Level Menu 
selection 










































Close all browser windows, set the peer level for 192.168.10.2 back to sl1:il3 in 
the Peer Level Database, and restart the MYSEA daemons before proceeding to the next 
test suite. 
 
K. ACCEPTANCE TEST CASE 2 FUNCTIONAL TESTING 
For test k1, log in from the TPE as mdemo1 and run a session at the default 
session level (sl1:il3).   Then, navigate to http://192.168.0.38/cgi-
bin/simple_cmd_win.cgi, make the menu selection indicated in the table entry below, and 
click “Execute.” 
To avoid cleanup issues, reboot the MYSEA server and restart the daemons 
between tests k1 and k2.  
For test k2, log in from the TPE as mdemo1, then click the “SAR” button and 
issue the “sl” command to change the session level to SIM_CONFIDENTIAL.  Run a 
session, then open a new browser window and navigate to http://192.168.0.38/cgi-







Session Level Menu selection Arg 1 Arg 2 Arg 3 Expected 
Result 











The output from test k1 should be a web page containing the following text.  (The 
“Current time” value will differ.) 
 
 
Demonstration of MYSEA Remote Application Support 
   
This is a sample web page. 
   
Web page request received from 192.168.0.38. 
Web page served by 192.168.0.38. 
Current time is Tue Mar 7 07:35:36 PST 2006. 
  
Process user name is mdemo1. 
Process session level is sl1 il3 (SIM_UNCLASSIFIED). 
 
 
The output from test k2 should be a web page containing the following text.  (The 




Demonstration of MYSEA Remote Application Support 
   
This is a sample web page. 
   
Web page request received from 192.168.0.38. 
Web page served by 192.168.0.38. 
Current time is Tue Mar 7 07:41:36 PST 2006. 
  
Process user name is mdemo1. 
Process session level is sl3 il3 (SIM_CONFIDENTIAL). 
 
 
L. ACCEPTANCE TEST CASE 2 EXCEPTION TESTING 
This test involves the re-configuration of the Peer Level Database.  Perform the 
steps listed in test j to undefine the peer level of host 192.168.0.38 in the Peer Level 
Database and restart the MYSEA daemons. 
Log in as mdemo1 via the TPE and run a session at the default session level.  
Navigate to http://192.168.0.38/cgi-bin/simple_cmd_win.cgi.  Select the menu item 






Menu selection Arg 1 Arg 2 Arg 3 Expected 
Result 











For future remote application support, restore the Peer Level Database to its 
original configuration after the completion of this test.  
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APPENDIX D:  TRSS DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING RESULTS 
A complete record of the observed TRSS developmental testing results is 
provided in the table below.  Observed results for all other test suites were identical to the 
expected results listed within the testing procedures of Appendix C. 
Test results may differ slightly from the observed results listed below due to 
random process ID assignment and timing issues, but in each case the client should report 




Menu selection Port Observed Result 
a1 2  - Do read testing N/A 
READ, error 0, buffer length 13 
---read 32 bytes--- 
a2 3  - Do write testing N/A 
read 32 bytes 
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEF 
WRITE, error 0, buffer length 14 
---write 32 bytes--- 
a3 4  - Do select testing 
- NON_BLOCKING 
N/A 
SELECT NB, error 0, buffer length 13 
---read 30 bytes--- 
a4 5  - Do listen testing 2000 
IP address is 192.168.0.38 
sin.addr is 0x2600a8c0 
Connected to 192.168.0.38, port 2000 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 4 
LISTEN, error 0, buffer length 28 
---Connection from 192.168.0.38--- 
a5 6  - Do accept 
testing 
2001 
IP address is 192.168.0.38 
sin.addr is 0x2600a8c0 
Waiting for a connection 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 4 
Connection from 192.168.0.38 
ACCEPT, error 0, buffer length 36 
---Connected to 192.168.0.38, port 
2001--- 
a6 7  - Do shutdown 
testing 
2002 
IP address is 192.168.0.38 
sin.addr is 0x2600a8c0 
Connected to 192.168.0.38, port 2002 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 4 
SHUTDOWN, error 0, buffer length 41 





Menu selection Port Observed Result 
a7 8  - Do send testing N/A 
read 32 bytes 
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEF 
SEND, error 0, buffer length 14 
---write 32 bytes--- 
a8 9  - Do sendto 
testing 
2003 
IP address is 192.168.0.38 
sin.addr is 0x2600a8c0 
calling recvfrom 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 4 
recvfrom 32 bytes 
Connection from 192.168.0.38 
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEF 
SENDTO, error 0, buffer length 15 
---sendto 32 bytes--- 
a9 A  - Do recv testing N/A 
RECV, error 0, buffer length 13 
---read 32 bytes--- 
a10 B  - Do recvfrom 
testing 
2004 
IP address is 192.168.0.38 
sin.addr is 0x2600a8c0 
calling sendto 
sendto 32 bytes 
RECVFROM, error 0, buffer length 36 
---recvfrom 32 bytes, from 
192.168.0.38--- 
a11 C  - Do fork testing N/A 
do_fork - read 41 bytes 
--in PARENT - PID 27421, child PID 
is 1911 
-- 
do_fork - read 127 bytes 
-- 
  -- 
get_result - read() only got 141 of 
268 




Menu selection Port Observed Result 
a12 D  - Do Blocked I/O 
testing 
2005 
IP address is 192.168.0.38 
sin.addr is 0x2600a8c0 
Connected to 192.168.0.38, port 2005 
Blocked I/O, error 0, buffer length 
17 
---fcntl() succeeded--- 
Blocked I/O, error 0, buffer length 
15 
---read() 30 bytes--- 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 4 
do_blockedio - read 1024 so far 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 4 
do_blockedio - read 2048 so far 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 4 
do_blockedio - read 3072 so far 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 4 
do_blockedio - read 4096 so far 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 4 
do_blockedio - read 5120 so far 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 4 
do_blockedio - read 6144 so far 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 4 
do_blockedio - read() only got 0 of 
1024 
do_blockedio - total read 6144 
Blocked I/O, error 0, buffer length 
18 




Menu selection Port Observed Result 
a13 E  - Do Misc testing 2006 
IP address is 192.168.0.38 
sin.addr is 0x2600a8c0 
Connected to 192.168.0.38, port 2006 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 3 
Miscellaneous, error 0, buffer 
length 18 
---fcntl(F_GETFD) - 0--- 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 3 
Miscellaneous, error 0, buffer 
length 18 
---fcntl(F_GETFL) - 2--- 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 3 
Miscellaneous, error 0, buffer 
length 18 
---fcntl(F_SETFD) - 0--- 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 3 
Miscellaneous, error 0, buffer 
length 18 
---fcntl(F_SETFL) - 0--- 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 3 
Miscellaneous, error 0, buffer 
length 26 
---getpeername - 192.168.0.38--- 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 3 
Miscellaneous, error 0, buffer 
length 26 
---getsockname - 192.168.0.38--- 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 3 
Miscellaneous, error 0, buffer 
length 25 
---getsockopt(KEEPALIVE) - 0--- 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 3 
Miscellaneous, error 0, buffer 
length 25 
---setsockopt(KEEPALIVE) - 1--- 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 3 
Miscellaneous, error 0, buffer 
length 17 
---ioctl – FIONREAD - 0--- 
Selecting - 3, 4- select() returns 
1- result is 3 
Current test all done, error 0,  
buffer EMPTY 
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It should be noted that the output of the test client was inconsistent for test a13 
(“Miscellaneous Testing”).  Specifically, the client would sometimes only print a partial 
result summary before concluding the test and printing a new command menu.  It is 
believed that this behavior was the result of the mskt_ioctl call added for the purpose of 
TRSS testing.  Because the test client was not adapted to take into account the 
consequences of this call (merely to check that it returned a result of 0), the addition of 
the call interfered with the normal operation of the client.  It was determined through the 
examination of TRSS log files that the TRSS Child process was handling the mskt_ioctl 
call correctly; the abnormal behavior was on the part of the test client.  Furthermore, 
whenever the client reported results at least through the “---ioctl – FIONREAD” line, 
the results reported for the mskt_ioctl call and all previous calls indicated a return value 
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